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ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE
FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE: RESTORING
THE ORIGINAL DESIGN
ALAN J. MEESE*
The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the
national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this
allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in
restraint of . . . commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that
the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and
national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of
precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints.
This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning,
unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the
regime of competitive federalism that had governed most intrastate restraints.
Drawing from its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism, the Court
initially employed the direct/indirect standard to allocate regulatory authority over
intrastate restraints. Effects were direct if a restraint exercised market power to injure
out-of-state consumers. The Sherman Act exerted Congress’s exclusive authority over
such restraints, because state regulation might produce self-interested results contrary
to the anti-favoritism principle that animated Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
States retained exclusive authority over agreements producing indirect impacts on
interstate commerce, and a regime of competitive federalism generated the rules
governing such restraints. Because states internalized the full impact of such
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restraints, interjurisdictional competition likely tended to produce optimal legal
rules.
Echoing Wickard v. Filburn, the Court jettisoned the direct/indirect standard
in 1948, holding that the Act reaches restraints producing a “substantial effect”—
even if harmless and indirect—on interstate commerce. This vast expansion of the
Act undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had governed most
intrastate restraints. This change also enabled application of the statute to local,
state-approved restraints, empowering antitrust courts to supervise state regulatory
processes, further undermining competitive federalism.
The Court has offered three rationales for rejecting the direct/indirect
standard. First, the Court has claimed that Congress meant to reach restraints
beyond the authority implied by pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. Second,
the Court has contended that the Act properly expands whenever the commerce
power expands in other contexts. Third, the Court has treated the substantial
effects test as a translation of the Act justified by a changed national economy.
The Court has invoked the Act’s legislative history to bolster the first two
contentions.
None of these rationales survives scrutiny. First, the phrase “restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States” was apparently a term of art drawn from
pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That case law employed “restraint”
of interstate commerce as a synonym for state “regulation” of such commerce
deemed invalid because it directly burdened interstate commerce. Given the prior
construction canon, Congress’s invocation of “restraint of . . . commerce” suggests
that the Act should condemn only those private agreements that “directly burden”
interstate commerce. The Court read the Act exactly this way in the 1890s,
repeatedly holding that agreements only restrained interstate commerce if they
imposed direct burdens by producing supracompetitive prices for interstate
transactions. These near-contemporaneous readings, themselves probative of
original meaning, avoided constitutional difficulties that would have resulted
from application of the Act to restraints causing no interstate harm.
Second, assertions that Congress chose to exercise whatever power future Courts
might grant are speculation. Congress has declined to exercise its entire commerce
power when enacting three different post-1890 antitrust statutes. Engrafting the
substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act contravened the federal-state balance
canon by supplanting traditional state prerogatives over restraints threatening no
interstate harm.
Third, the substantial effects test is not a faithful translation of the Sherman
Act. No court or scholar has identified changed circumstances that justify such
a translation. Neither integration of the national economy nor increased scale
of enterprises suggests that such restraints generally produce interstate harm or
that states are incapable of regulating them.

2020] ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 77
The legislative history actually bolsters this textual analysis. Several Senators
endorsed pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence. The Senate Judiciary Committee
rewrote Sherman’s bill, employing the term “restraint of commerce” to narrow its
reach. The House passed the Senate bill verbatim, after its Judiciary Committee also
embraced dual federalism. No member of Congress suggested that the Act would
expand if the Court subsequently enlarged the scope of the commerce power.
The conclusion that the Court erred in 1948 does not itself justify return to
the pre-1948 allocation of authority over antitrust matters. While stare decisis
is weaker in the antitrust context, mere legal error does not suffice to upset
longstanding precedent. If, however, the Court attributes the 1948 revision and
continued expansion of the Act to changed economic circumstances—such as
increased integration of the national economy—stare decisis should yield to post1948 developments in the theory of competitive federalism. These developments
confirmed that states possess appropriate incentives to generate impartial rules
with respect to restraints that produce no interstate harm.
Reviving the direct/indirect standard would reboot competitive federalism in
antitrust. The resulting competition between state “laboratories of democracy”
would generate various substantive and institutional solutions to antitrust
problems, as states vie for producers and consumers by offering rival packages of
antitrust doctrine and enforcement institutions. Restoring the pre-1948 regime
would also radically shrink the category of state-approved restraints potentially
subject to the Act. Moreover, cases involving such restraints that did reach the
Court would look quite different from those that have informed the Court’s
treatment of these restraints. Instead of state regulation of local billboards and
the like, such cases would involve restraints imposing substantial harm on outof-state consumers. This new framing could force the current Court, which has
less faith in regulation than its predecessors, to reconsider its approach to stateapproved restraints.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress limited regulatory powers,
leaving the remaining authority to the states. Passed in 1890, the
Sherman Antitrust Act1 (“the Sherman Act” or “the Act”) reflects this
allocation of responsibility, reaching only a subset of trade restraints,
while states retain authority over the rest. This Article contends that the
Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state
and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abandoning several
decades of precedent that recognized exclusive state authority over most
intrastate restraints. This change contravened the apparent intent of
Congress, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and
undermined the regime of competitive federalism that had generated the
rules governing intrastate restraints producing no interstate harm.
The Sherman Act reaches only those restraints of trade that also restrain
“commerce among the several States.”2 The Supreme Court initially read
this language to place meaningful limits on the scope of the Act. Drawing
upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of dual federalism, the Court
held that the Act usually did not reach intrastate restraints—that is,
agreements governing transactions or transportation confined to one
state. Intrastate cartels and mergers thus fell within the exclusive

1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
2. Id. § 1.
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jurisdiction of individual states, even if such restraints indirectly
affected interstate commerce.
There was an important caveat, however. When intrastate restraints
affected interstate commerce “directly,” the Sherman Act reached such
agreements to the exclusion of the states. Effects were direct if the
restraint produced antitrust harm that crossed state lines, by exercising
market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. For more
than five decades, the Act reached only those restraints that produced
interstate harm, leaving states with exclusive authority over all other
restraints within their respective borders. Authority over trade
restraints thus resided in mutually exclusive domains, and a regime of
competitive federalism produced the rules governing those restraints
within the exclusive authority of the states.
The Court abruptly changed course in 1948, greatly expanding the Act’s
reach and adjusting the boundaries between state and federal authority in
favor of the federal government. Echoing Wickard v. Filburn,3 the Court
replaced the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test.4
Thus, the Sherman Act now reaches local restraints producing no interstate
harm.
The resulting fundamental change left states and the national
government with concurrent authority over most of the nation’s trade
restraints, subjecting parties to regulation by two sovereigns. While
mainly directed at private restraints, this vast expansion of the Act also
resulted in possible application of the statute to numerous stateapproved restraints that previously exceeded the statute’s reach.
Although the Court initially held that state-approved restraints are
immune from the Act under the so-called “state action” doctrine, it
subsequently conditioned this immunity on the satisfaction of certain
procedural requirements. As a result, adoption of the substantial
effects test rendered the statute a vehicle for second-guessing local
regulatory decisions and the process employed to reach them. The new
regime also raised the specter of Sherman Act preemption of state
antitrust laws. Finally, the change undermined the role of competitive
federalism in generating legal rules to govern local restraints that
produced no interstate harm.
Reinterpretation of an unchanged statute requires some explanation.
The Court has offered three distinct rationales for replacing the
direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test. First, the Court
3. 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
4. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
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has claimed that the 1890 Congress did not share the 1890 Court’s
commitment to dual federalism and related belief that authority over
trade restraints was mutually exclusive. Instead, it has said that Congress
meant to reach local restraints that substantially but indirectly impact
interstate commerce, without displacing concurrent state authority
over such agreements. Second, the Court has claimed that Congress
meant to exercise its entire commerce power, including any additional
authority obtained when the commerce power expands outside the
antitrust context, as it did when Wickard announced a novel standard
expanding the scope of Congress’s authority. Third, the Court has
claimed that changed economic circumstances, including increased
integration of the national economy and growth in the size of business
enterprises, justified revising application of the Act to reach local
restraints that substantially impact interstate commerce. Put another
way, the 1948 revision translated the underlying principle informing
the scope of the Act in light of new information and thus faithfully
applied Congress’s normative choices.
Each of these arguments rests upon express or implied assertions
about the original meaning of the Sherman Act. This Article examines
the meaning of the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce among the
several States” and thus evaluates the Court’s three rationales for
replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test.
This examination concludes that the substantial effects test does not
faithfully implement the original meaning of the Act.
All the available evidence of original statutory meaning rebuts the
first rationale and confirms that the Sherman Act incorporates the
direct/indirect standard to define the boundary between state and
national authority over trade restraints. The Congress that wrote the
Act did so against the background of a highly developed Supreme Court
jurisprudence defining the scope of the commerce power and allocating
regulatory authority between states and the national government. This
jurisprudence read the Commerce Clause as implementing an antifavoritism principle, empowering Congress to preempt state legislation
that enriched one state’s citizens at the expense of others.
While Congress rarely exercised this power by enacting legislation,
the Court created a quasi-statutory regime under which congressional
silence regarding “inherently national” subjects signaled Congress’s will to
preempt state laws regulating such activities. State legislation regulated
these subjects, in turn, if it produced direct impacts on interstate
commerce. Laws affecting interstate commerce only indirectly exceeded
the scope of Congress’s power and thus could not interfere with any
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exclusive national authority. Reading the Sherman Act to reach local
restraints that substantially but only indirectly affect interstate
commerce would exceed the scope of the commerce power articulated
in this pre-1890 jurisprudence and contravene the avoidance canon,
which requires courts to read statutes so as not to exceed judiciallyimposed constitutional limitations.
The avoidance canon offers no affirmative account of statutory meaning.
The prior construction canon does, however. The quasi-statutory regime
described above produced terms of art that illuminated the meaning of the
Act. Major cases during the 1880s referred to state laws that “directly
burdened” and thus regulated interstate commerce as “restraints” of that
commerce, treating the terms “regulate” and “restrain” as synonymous.
The Congress that passed the Sherman Act was presumably aware of
these decisions. Thus, the Act’s invocation of “restraint of . . . commerce
among the several States,” suggested that the Act would perform the same
role vis-á-vis private agreements that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
played with respect to state legislation. Congress “presumably kn[ew] and
adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached” to this term of art,
including the direct/indirect standard employed when evaluating
challenges to state legislation.5 This realization suggests that the Act
condemns only those “restraints of trade” that also “directly obstruct” or
“directly burden” interstate commerce. Following this logic, the Act left
agreements that caused no such effects unscathed, even if they otherwise
restrain (intrastate) trade and produce substantial effects on interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court read the Act in exactly this manner during the
1890s. In five unanimous or near unanimous decisions, the Court
construed the Act to ban only those restraints of trade that impacted
interstate commerce “directly.” Agreements affecting interstate commerce
“indirectly”—even if they otherwise restrained trade and produced
substantial intrastate harm—exceeded the scope of the Act. Congress
banned agreements that directly impacted interstate commerce, the
Court said, because they may impose the same harmful impact on such
commerce as analogous state laws preempted by Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Intrastate restraints produced a “direct” impact on
interstate commerce if they exercised market power to the detriment
of consumers in other states.
The Court also offered a functional rationale for its definition of
“restraint of commerce” and resulting allocation of authority between
5. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
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states and the national government. Drawing upon the anti-favoritism
principle that animated its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
observed that allowing states to regulate agreements that directly
impacted interstate commerce would result in conflicting legislation
reflecting each state’s “particular interest.”6 Thus, the Court read the Act
to reach only those restraints that threatened interstate harm and thereby
tempted states to adopt rules governing such agreements that favored
their own citizens at the expense of others. These contemporaneous
constructions, which replicated the meaning suggested by the prior
construction canon, are important evidence of the statute’s original
meaning and bolster the conclusion that the Act does not reach intrastate
agreements producing substantial but indirect effects on interstate
commerce.
The second rationale for the substantial effects test—that Congress
meant the Sherman Act to expand with the commerce power—fares no
better. To be sure, changed circumstances could result in revised
applications of an unchanged direct/indirect standard, thereby altering
the practical boundary between state and national authority and
effectuating the intent of Congress to reach conduct that produces
particular effects. But the substantial effects test is an entirely new standard
unknown to the 1890 Congress, a standard that reflects different normative
choices about the proper allocation of regulatory authority in the federal
system. The Court has nonetheless claimed that Congress meant the
scope of the Sherman Act to expand accordingly, reaching conduct that
produces only indirect, but substantial, effects on interstate commerce.
However, the empirical basis for this claim is questionable, to say the
least. Congress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its
commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects
to the states. Indeed, Congress has declined three different times to
exercise its entire commerce power when enacting post-1890 antitrust
legislation. It thus seems altogether possible that the 1890 Congress
would not have exercised more expansive authority than conferred by
the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence if given the
opportunity to do so. Nothing in the Act’s text speaks to how the 1890
Congress would have (re)drafted the Act in response to the sort of
fundamental constitutional change that Wickard wrought.
The federal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma. Since the early
1940s, the Supreme Court has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes
to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation. More
6. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231–32 (1899).
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recently, the Court has recognized that trade restraints are topics
“traditionally regulated by the States.”7 Replacing the direct/indirect
standard with the substantial effects test contravened this canon by
expanding an ambiguous Sherman Act to supplant traditional state
prerogatives.
The statutory analysis that compels rejection of the first two rationales
for the substantial effects test also facilitates evaluation of the final claim,
i.e., that the test is a valid translation of the underlying principle
informing the scope of the Act. By enacting the phrase “restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States,” Congress apparently embraced
the anti-favoritism principle animating the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Under this approach, intrastate agreements ran
afoul of the Sherman Act if they produced harm exceeding the
boundaries of a single state, with the result that state regulation of such
activity would produce self-interested results.
The substantial effects test is not a faithful translation of this principle.
No proponent of the test has identified any changed circumstances
suggesting that agreements inducing substantial but indirect impacts on
interstate commerce generally produce interstate harm. The nation’s
economy is certainly more integrated than in 1890, enterprises have
achieved greater scale, and more agreements impact interstate commerce.
However, proof that more restraints produce effects—direct or indirect—
on interstate commerce does not imply that the direct/indirect standard is
somehow an inadequate method for ascertaining whether the Sherman Act
reaches a particular restraint or that states lack proper incentives to
police such restraints. Instead of translating the Sherman Act in a new
context, the substantial effects test implements an entirely new
principle, contradicting Congress’s normative choices.
This Article primarily employs conventional techniques of statutory
interpretation—namely, the text and relevant canons of construction
that shed light on that text’s plain meaning to those who drafted it. But
the Court has also invoked a few sentences from the Act’s legislative
history in support of the substantial effects test. Proponents of the
substantial effects test may contend that such history constitutes the
sort of clear statement that overrides the federal-state balance canon,
for instance. However, this Article examines the Act’s legislative history
and concludes that such history actually bolsters the result of this
Article’s textual analysis.

7. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 & n.4 (1989).
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The legislative history reveals that key members of Congress fully
understood the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence and aimed to
implement it. To be sure, some applications of bills Senator Sherman
introduced would have exceeded the scope of the commerce power
defined by the Court’s precedents. However, several Senators who
embraced the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence, including
mutually exclusive authority over trade restraints, opposed Sherman’s
proposals. Over Sherman’s objection, the Senate directed its Judiciary
Committee to redraft Sherman’s bill, narrowing its reach and producing
what became the Sherman Act. The actual author of the statute’s
language, Senator George Edmunds, had opined that Congress lacked
authority to ban formation of the sugar trust, presaging the Court’s 1895
holding to this effect in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.8
The House Judiciary Committee report on the Senate measure
embraced dual federalism and mutually exclusive authority over trade
restraints. The Committee endorsed the bill as “carefully confined to
such subjects of legislation as are clearly within the legislative authority
of Congress.”9 The Committee also observed that “[n]o attempt is
made to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to
occupy doubtful grounds.”10
No member of Congress suggested that the reach of the Act would
expand if the Court created a novel standard governing the scope of the
commerce power. Indeed, one Senator whose remarks the Supreme
Court has selectively invoked characterized the commerce power as
quite narrow, opining that the Act would leave most trusts unscathed.
Assertions that Congress meant the Act to expand along with entirely
revised conceptions of the commerce power are speculation with no
support in the legislative history.
The conclusion that the substantial effects test is an erroneous
interpretation of the Sherman Act does not itself justify return to the pre1948 allocation of authority over antitrust matters. While stare decisis has
a relatively weak claim in the antitrust context, mere legal error does not
suffice to upset longstanding precedent. If, on the other hand, the
Court attributes the 1948 revision and continued expansion of the Act to
changed economic circumstances—such as increased integration of the
national economy—stare decisis should yield to post-1948 developments
in the theory of competitive federalism. These developments confirm
8. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9. H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890).
10. Id.
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that states possess appropriate incentives to generate impartial rules
with respect to intrastate restraints that produce no interstate harm.
Abandoning the substantial effects test and retracting the scope of
the Sherman Act would reboot competitive federalism in the antitrust
field. The resulting competition between state “laboratories of
democracy” would presumably generate a variety of substantive and
institutional solutions to various antitrust problems, as states vie for
producers and consumers by offering rival packages of antitrust doctrine
and enforcement institutions.
Restoring the pre-1948 regime would also radically shrink the
category of state-approved restraints potentially subject to the Act.
Instead of state regulation of local billboards and the like, state action
cases reaching the Court would involve restraints imposing substantial
interstate harm. This new framing could force the current Court, less
friendly to regulation than its post-New Deal predecessors, to reconsider
its hands-off approach to state-approved restraints. Narrowing the
Sherman Act’s reach could ironically encourage more robust preemption
of state-approved restraints.
Finally, the history recounted here would alter the question posed
in state action cases. The Court’s state action decisions emphasize that
Congress did not anticipate Sherman Act preemption of stateapproved restraints. However, the Court is answering an anachronistic
question. The 1890 Congress would have assumed that state-approved
direct restraints of interstate commerce would fall prey to the Court’s
regime of implied preemption, a regime later eclipsed by the Court’s
more permissive dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Thus, the
real question for a Court reconsidering the Act’s treatment of stateapproved restraints is how Congress would have treated such restraints
absent implied preemption, and this question could produce a quite
different answer.
Part I of this Article reviews the Court’s pre-1948 jurisprudence
regarding the scope of the Sherman Act, particularly the articulation
of the direct/indirect standard and its application to intrastate restraints.
Part II recounts the Supreme Court’s post-New Deal expansion of the Act
to reach intrastate restraints that induce substantial but fortuitous effects
on interstate commerce. Part III details the three rationales the Court has
offered to justify rejection of the direct/indirect standard in favor of the
substantial effects test. Part IV reviews the content of the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence when Congress debated and passed
the Sherman Act. Part V draws upon the lessons of this review and
assesses the original meaning of the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce
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among the several States,” employing several accepted canons of
construction. This Part also evaluates the contentions that the scope of
the Sherman Act properly expands with the scope of the commerce power
and that changed circumstances justify replacing the direct/indirect
standard with the substantial effects test. Part VI reviews the legislative
history of the Act. Finally, Part VII explores selected implications of the
finding that the Court’s adoption of the substantial effects test was
unwarranted.
I. EARLY CASE LAW AND THE DIRECT/INDIRECT STANDARD: 1890–1948
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act bans contracts “in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States.”11 Thus, a contract “in restraint
of trade” does not violate the Act unless it also restrains “commerce
among the several States.”12 For several decades, the Supreme Court
read this latter phrase to place meaningful limits on the statute’s reach,
leaving states with exclusive authority over a large portion of the nation’s
trade restraints.13 “Commerce,” the Court said, consisted of “intercourse
and traffic,” including transportation and sale or barter of goods.14
Accordingly, the statute reached agreements setting rates for interstate
transportation or prices of goods exchanged across state lines.15 However,
the Act generally did not reach intrastate restraints, i.e., agreements
governing commerce confined to a single state, such as cartels in one state
fixing prices charged to consumers in that same state.16

11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
12. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1940) (“[T]he phrase
‘restraint of trade’ . . . was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. The
addition of the words ‘or commerce among the several states’ . . . was the means used
to relate the prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional
purposes.”).
13. See, e.g., Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200
U.S. 179, 183–84 (1906) (holding that the Act did not reach a covenant limiting
competition within waters of single state); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 247–48 (1899) (holding that the Act did not reach intrastate cartels).
14. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 241.
15. Id. (holding that the Act reaches any contract that “directly restrains not alone
the manufacture, but the purchase, sale or exchange of the manufactured commodity
among the several States”); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569
(1898) (applying the Act to agreement governing interstate railroad rates).
16. Cincinnati Packet Co., 200 U.S. at 183–84; Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 247–48; see
also Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80 (1925) (explaining that the
challenged restraint did not limit “the freedom of the [out-of-state] manufacturer to
sell and ship or of the local contractor to buy” and thus was intrastate).
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Some intrastate restraints also affected interstate commerce, suggesting
a possible exception to this general rule. In such cases, the Court
distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” effects, holding that the
statute only reached intrastate restraints producing the former.17 The
Court drew the direct/indirect standard from its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.18 That case law articulated a vision of “dual federalism,”
which treated state and national authority over most economic activity as
mutually exclusive.19
Decisions implementing this vision allocated to Congress sole authority
over most interstate activity, leaving states with exclusive authority over
conduct occurring only within their borders. To preserve Congress’s
authority, the Court invalidated state regulation of local activity that
affected interstate commerce directly and thus effectively regulated such
commerce, exercising power solely committed to Congress.20 Where,
however, state regulation only affected interstate commerce indirectly,

17. Compare United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183–84 (1911)
(finding that the Act applied to transactions creating a national monopoly and thus
directly restraining interstate commerce), and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 68–69, 74–75 (1911) (same), and Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
397 (1905) (holding that the Act applied to intrastate restraints with interstate
commerce as their “direct object” and “object of attack”), with Cincinnati Packet Co.,
200 U.S. at 183–84 (declining to extend the Act to agreement where “interference with
[interstate] commerce is insignificant and incidental, and not the dominant purpose
of the contract”), and Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 591–92 (1898) (declining
to extend the Act to agreement that “indirectly . . . add[ed] to the price paid by a
purchaser”), and Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616–18 (1898) (declining
to extend the Act to activities affecting interstate commerce “in the most roundabout
and indirect manner”).
18. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30 (explaining that the Act reached
agreements producing the same impact as state restraints directly affecting interstate
commerce); Anderson, 171 U.S. at 616 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473
(1888)) (“‘[T]he acknowledged powers of a State may be exerted and applied in such
a manner as to affect foreign or interstate commerce without being intended to
operate as commercial regulations.’ The same is true as to [particular contracts among
firms in an industry that] . . . regulat[e] the conduct of their business among
themselves and with the public.”).
19. See infra notes 20–49 and accompanying text (describing the development and
content of this jurisprudence).
20. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886)
(invalidating state regulation of intrastate railroad rates directly burdening interstate
commerce); see also Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1096–99 (2000) (describing early twentieth
century antitrust decisions as exemplifying Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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such provisions remained unscathed.21 Given the assumption of mutually
exclusive regulatory domains, decisions clarifying the scope of state
authority also defined the affirmative scope of congressional power.22
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.23 exemplified the Court’s
reliance upon the direct/indirect standard to delimit the scope of the
Sherman Act.24 There, a non-union coal company exported most of its
output to other states.25 A union sought recognition as the exclusive
representative of the firm’s employees and termination of non-union
workers, violently closing the company’s mine.26 Lower courts condemned
the conspiracy under the Sherman Act.27 A unanimous Supreme Court
reversed.28
The Court conceded that the conspiracy restrained trade and
prevented the production and export of coal to other states.29 The
Court also found that the union consistently discouraged the existence
of non-union mines because competition from such mines threatened
union wages.30 Unionization was “a means of lessening interstate
competition for union operators” and “lessen[ed] the pressure of
those operators for reduction of the union scale.”31 Nonetheless, the
Court held that this was “a secondary or ancillary motive.”32 The main
motive was to “better[] the conditions and wages of [union] workers”
at the local mine.33 While the union’s success could have encouraged
similar firms to maintain union shops, impacting interstate commerce,
this result was “remote” and did not justify application of the Act.34 The
21. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1888) (explaining that a state’s
ban on alcohol production impacted interstate commerce merely indirectly, despite
intent to export such alcohol, and thus exceeded the scope of the commerce power).
22. See, e.g., infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
23. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
24. See id. at 408–13; see also Cushman, supra note 20, at 1096–98 (discussing
Coronado Coal as an exemplar of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
25. Id. at 412.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 412.
30. Id. (reporting that unionization producing higher wages increased costs by
seventeen to twenty cents per ton).
31. Id. at 408.
32. Id. at 408–09 (“Obstruction to coal mining is not a direct obstruction to
interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course, may affect it by reducing the
amount of coal to be carried in that commerce.”).
33. Id. at 408.
34. Id. at 413.
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Act would only reach such conduct if the union had intended to impact
interstate commerce.35 While sufficient, express proof of intent was not
necessary. Instead, drawing upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
the Court said such an intent “must be inferred” if the agreement
“necessarily [had] a direct, material and substantial effect to restrain
[interstate commerce].”36
A direct effect would arise, the Court said, if the defendants
attempted “to unionize mines whose product was important, actually
or potentially, in affecting prices in interstate commerce.”37 Such a
conspiracy would not “involve interstate commerce intrinsically”
because the agreement would not govern any interstate transactions.38
Still, the (intrastate) restraint would “affect[] interstate commerce so
directly as to be within the federal regulatory power.”39 The Court
invoked a prior case, United States v. Patten,40 where the defendants’
intrastate conspiracy had produced such an effect by cornering the
market in cotton traded on the New York City Cotton Exchange.41
Although the reduced cotton supply was not itself interstate
commerce, the object of the conspiracy was “to obtain control of the
available supply and to enhance the price to all buyers in every market
of the country.”42 The “necessary effect” was to “directly . . . burden the
due course of trade among the States and inflict upon the public the
injuries which the [Sherman] Act was designed to prevent,” i.e., to
increase the price of cotton sold across state lines.43 By contrast, the
restraint before the Court could have no similar impact because the
mine produced a small share of the nation’s coal, so that shuttering
the mine would not alter interstate coal prices.44 Thus, the
direct/indirect standard defined the affirmative limits of the “federal
regulatory power” and therefore the Sherman Act.45
35. Id. at 410–11.
36. Id. at 411.
37. Id. at 409.
38. Id. at 410; see also Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 80 (1925)
(explaining that the challenged restraint was intrastate because it did not limit
freedom of out-of-state firms to supply local contractors).
39. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 410.
40. 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
41. Id. at 536–39.
42. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 410 (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525).
43. Id. (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525).
44. Id. at 412 (stating that challenged conspiracy “would have no appreciable
effect upon the price of coal or non-union competition”).
45. See id. at 410 (citing Patten, 226 U.S. 525).
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The Court reiterated this standard several times, including in cases
where targets or proponents of the restraint purchased inputs from
other states. Such restraints, while local, ultimately induced a reduction
in interstate purchases by the affected firms.46 While the Court continued
to invoke “intent” as an element of the test, results effectively turned on
the probable economic impact of the challenged restraint, which courts
ascertained after a flexible and fact-intensive analysis.47 According to this
case law, a mere reduction in interstate purchases or sales by targets or
proponents of such restraints did not justify application of the Act, as such
interstate impacts were “clearly incidental, indirect and remote.”48 For
several decades after passage of the Sherman Act, then, the Court
consistently and repeatedly allocated to states exclusive authority over
intrastate restraints that produced only intrastate harm and affected
interstate commerce indirectly. Congress, however, retained exclusive
authority over those intrastate restraints that affected interstate
commerce directly. Thus, the Act only reached those intrastate restraints
that produced harmful impacts in the form of non-competitive prices
for interstate transactions, injuring consumers in multiple states.49

46. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1933) (holding
that strikes aimed at local builders exceeded the commerce power and Sherman Act
although they reduced interstate steel purchases); id. at 107 (“It is this exclusively local
aim, and not the fortuitous and incidental effect upon interstate commerce, which
gives character to the conspiracy.”); Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64,
80 (1925) (finding that the Act did not reach conspiracy to deprive local rivals of inputs
because “[t]he effect upon, and interference with, interstate trade, if any, were clearly
incidental, indirect and remote”); United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924) (declining to apply Act to boycott of trunk
manufacturers selling most of their output in interstate commerce).
47. See, e.g., Indus. Ass’n of S.F., 268 U.S. at 77–81 (assessing impact of restraint
absent intent to restrain interstate commerce); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 66, 70–71 (1911) (describing direct/indirect test as fact-intensive
standard); see also infra note 195 and accompanying text (characterizing Commerce
Clause’s direct/indirect test as a standard and not a rule).
48. Indus. Ass’n of S.F., 268 U.S. at 80.
49. See In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 294–95 (Mass. 1912) (concluding that
state lacked authority over agreements restraining interstate commerce); James May,
Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach
of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 518 (1987) (“Federal and state
jurists often declared that states could not constitutionally regulate anticompetitive
activity within interstate commerce, [establishing] some significant limitations on the
scope of state antitrust provisions . . . .”); infra notes 333–38 and accompanying text
(explaining Addyston Pipe’s conclusion that state and federal authority over trade
restraints was mutually exclusive).
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States exercised their exclusive authority in various ways.50 Some
employed corporate law, invalidating certain anticompetitive practices.51
All employed contract law, declining to enforce unreasonable restraints.52
At least one relied upon a general law against conspiracies to injure
trade.53 Finally, beginning in the 1880s, numerous states enacted antitrust
legislation governing intrastate restraints.54 State antitrust enforcement
activity exceeded that of the federal government for two decades after
passage of the Sherman Act.55 Between 1890 and 1919, Texas collected
more antitrust fines than the United States.56 State and federal courts
sustained application of these statutes to local activity affecting interstate
commerce indirectly.57
During this period, then, a robust regime of competitive federalism
generated antitrust doctrine and enforcement institutions governing a
large proportion of the nation’s trade restraints. Because competing
states internalized the costs and benefits of these rival packages of doctrine
and institutions, such interjurisdictional competition presumably enhanced
the quality of such regimes, improving society’s welfare compared to an
allocation of authority in which a single lawgiver produced legislation
50. See May, supra note 49, at 497–507 (describing state antitrust regulation of
intrastate restraints from 1880 to 1918).
51. See, e.g., People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834, 840 (N.Y. 1890)
(holding that a corporation exceeded its charter by delegating decisions to rivals);
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 286–87 (Ohio 1892); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An
Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 76–85 (1990) (exploring evolution of state
corporate law in response to anticompetitive mergers).
52. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (6th Cir. 1898)
(summarizing common law of contract that governed enforceability of trade
restraints).
53. See Hooker & Woodward v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847)
(declining to enforce price fixing agreement as contravening statute banning “act[s]
injurious to trade or commerce”).
54. See May, supra note 49, at 499 (reporting that thirteen states enacted antitrust
legislation before 1890, twenty-seven by 1900, and thirty-five by 1915).
55. Id. at 499–501.
56. Id. at 501–02.
57. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910)
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to state antitrust regulation incidentally
affecting interstate commerce); In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 295 (Mass. 1912)
(finding that proposed antitrust statute reached only intrastate restraints and thus did
not regulate interstate commerce, even though the statute “may interfere to some
extent with such commerce” by “incidentally, but not primarily, affecting” it); May,
supra note 49, at 521 n.130 (“[S]tates were left substantial room . . . to regulate despite
an effect on interstate commerce . . . .”).
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applicable to all the nation’s trade restraints.58 By contrast, the national
government generated the doctrine and institutions governing restraints
that exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers,
because the interstate nature of such harm raised the prospect that state
regulation of these restraints would produce self-interested results.
II. POST-NEW DEAL EXPANSION
A. Wickard, Mandeville Island Farms, and the Substantial Effects Test
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court drew the direct/indirect
standard that determined the scope of the Sherman Act from its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, treating state and national authority
over trade restraints as mutually exclusive.59 During the 1940s, the
Court rejected this framework. Most famously, in Wickard v. Filburn,60
the Court rejected both dual federalism and the direct/indirect
standard as valid expositions of the Commerce Clause.61 The Court
characterized the direct/indirect standard as exemplifying the
“mechanical application[] of [a] legal formula[]” that obscured the
relevant inquiry—namely, the “economic effect[]” of the regulated
activity.62 Decisions employing this standard to define the affirmative
reach of Congress’s power had erred, the Court said, by assuming that
state and congressional power over activities affecting interstate
commerce were mutually exclusive, with the result that Congress could
not regulate activities impacting interstate commerce indirectly.63

58. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 23, 34 (1983) (describing conditions, including lack of interstate externalities,
under which competitive federalism “causes a powerful tendency toward optimal
legislation”); Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction:
A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403, 451–59 (2004)
(describing the benefits of competitive federalism in production of antitrust doctrine
and asserting that state and federal antitrust law “will iterate more quickly toward the
optimal set of legal rules” under this regime); infra note 188 and accompanying text
(collecting additional authorities discussing conditions under which interjurisdictional
competition induces a tendency toward optimal legislation).
59. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
60. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61. Id. at 120, 125.
62. Id. at 123–24. But see Alan J. Meese, Wickard Through an Antitrust Lens, 60 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1335, 1377–82 (2019) (explaining that the Sherman Act’s direct/indirect
standard focused precisely on whether challenged restraints produced the prohibited
economic effect).
63. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120–21.
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The Court replaced the direct/indirect standard with the “substantial
effects” test.64 Under this approach, Congress could regulate any activity
that produced a “substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce,
even if the effect was indirect and states possessed coextensive authority
over such conduct.65 The Court also held that Congress could reach
conduct that individually produced a trivial impact on interstate
commerce if the entire class of activities, when aggregated together,
induced a substantial effect.66
Wickard was not an antitrust case but instead involved a 1938 statute
expressly regulating local farm production.67 The Sherman Act
remained unchanged. Still, just six years after Wickard, in Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,68 the Court rejected the
direct/indirect standard as an appropriate exposition of the Sherman
Act.69 The Court embraced Wickard’s critique of the direct/indirect
standard, including the claim that the standard was mechanical and
artificial, obscuring the actual economic impact of challenged
restraints.70 The Court also characterized the standard as an artifact of
discredited dual federalism.71 Just as the commerce power had come
to reach any conduct that produced a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, so too did the Sherman Act reach any agreement “in
restraint of trade” that produced such an effect.72
Some language in Mandeville Island Farms suggested that only
harmful effects counted as “substantial” for purposes of the newly
minted substantial effects test.73 However, the Court soon confirmed
that harmless and incidental impacts on interstate commerce could

64. Id. at 125.
65. See id. (explaining that classification of an effect as direct or indirect has no
bearing on whether the economic effect is “substantial”).
66. Id. at 127–29.
67. Id. at 114–15 (discussing and applying the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31).
68. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
69. Id. at 243–44.
70. Id. at 230–32 (invoking Wickard’s “familiar story of the progression of [Commerce
Clause] decision[s]”).
71. See id. at 229–30 (critiquing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895),
and subsequent decisions “embracing the same artificially drawn lines”).
72. See id. at 232–34.
73. See id. at 234 (asking “whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse
to Congress’[s] paramount policy . . . to constitute a forbidden consequence”).

94

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:75

nonetheless be “substantial.”74 Burke v. Ford75 exemplifies this approach.
There, Oklahoma liquor retailers challenged a horizontal agreement
allocating territories among the state’s liquor wholesalers.76 The
intrastate agreement could only injure the state’s own retailers and
consumers.77 While wholesalers purchased liquor from out-of-state
firms, the restraint did not govern such purchases.78 There was no
indication that the restraint impacted price, output, or quality in any
interstate liquor market.79
The Court conceded that the agreement did not itself restrain
interstate commerce.80 Nonetheless, the Court invoked Mandeville
Island Farms and a subsequent decision holding that the Sherman Act
reached intrastate restraints producing a “substantial effect” on
interstate commerce.81 The Act thus reached the wholesalers’ cartel
because a successful conspiracy would reduce in-state liquor sales and
thus wholesalers’ interstate liquor purchases.82 The Court did not
assess the possible impact of that reduction on the price or overall
output of interstate liquor. Nor was there any reason to believe the
conspiracy could have such an impact or that Oklahoma was unable to
protect consumers from its wholesalers.83 Nonetheless, the Court
74. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Lathers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 198, 200 (1954)
(finding that agreement restricting entry into the Chicago lathing trade substantially
affected interstate commerce because lathers purchased some supplies from other
states). While the complaint asserted that the challenged restrictions on the Chicago
lathing trade also “directly restrain[ed] and affect[ed] the interstate flow of lathing
materials,” the Court did not assert or suggest that the complaint alleged any interstate
harm. Id.
75. 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 320.
77. See id. at 320–22.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 320–21; cf. supra notes 17–45 and accompanying text (describing
decisions holding that such an impact was necessary to apply Act to intrastate restraints).
80. See Burke, 389 U.S. at 321–22 (holding that despite the lack of direct impact on
interstate commerce, the “wholesalers’ market division inevitably affected interstate
commerce”).
81. See id. at 321 (citing United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 186
(1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948))
(“[A]ctivity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope
of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce.”).
82. Id. at 322 (“The wholesalers’ territorial division here almost surely resulted in
fewer sales to retailers—hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers—than would
have occurred had free competition prevailed . . . .”).
83. Cf. supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (recounting robust state antitrust
enforcement at the turn of the twentieth century).
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found that the surmised incidental impact on wholesalers’ liquor
purchases was a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.84 Here again,
the Court invoked effects previously deemed “incidental,” “indirect,”
“obscure,” “remote,” and “fortuitous” to justify application of the Act
to an intrastate restraint producing only localized harm.85
Modern decisions have repeatedly reiterated the substantial effects
test announced in Mandeville Island Farms.86 Thus, the Act now reaches
numerous restraints that produce harm confined to a single state—
that is, restraints that do not alter the price or quality of any product
sold in interstate markets.87 To be sure, the substantial effects test
captures restraints that impose interstate harm and thereby qualified
as “direct” under the direct/indirect standard. However, by design, the
test also captures local restraints that produce no interstate harm and
impact interstate commerce only indirectly. This change has substantially
increased the scope of the Sherman Act, while simultaneously leaving
states with concurrent authority over restraints within their borders that
also affect interstate commerce.

84. See Burke, 389 U.S. at 321–22 (reasoning that prices increased and unit sales
decreased due to reduced competition).
85. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that
similar effects did not justify application of the Act).
86. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1991) (holding
that the Act reached a group boycott by one hospital’s physicians against a single
physician); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 245 (1980)
(explaining that the Act reached price fixing by city’s realtors because purchasers
often sought out-of-state financing); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,
744 (1976) (holding that the Act reached a scheme preventing a hospital’s expansion
because, inter alia, the expanding hospital would have purchased additional supplies
from out-of-state vendors); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784–85 (1975)
(explaining that the Act reached an agreement setting title search fees in one county).
87. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 501 (2015)
(invalidating agreement between the state’s dentists to exclude non-dentists from
teeth-whitening); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 773, 776–77 (1999)
(evaluating challenge to agreement between state’s dentists not to engage in
fraudulent advertising); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463–66 (1986)
(invalidating agreement between local dentists not to provide insurers with x-rays);
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4–5 (1984) (evaluating challenge
to tying contract imposed by a single hospital in one city); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 726–28 (1977) (evaluating challenge to a horizontal agreement between
Illinois firms manufacturing bricks for Illinois highway projects); United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 94, 110–11 (1975) (evaluating a merger between
Georgia banks); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 271, 274 (1966)
(invalidating a merger between Los Angeles grocery stores).
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B. Substantial Effects and the Collapse of Competitive Federalism
The Court’s significant expansion of the Act and recognition of
concurrent authority over numerous local restraints radically altered
the balance between state and federal power over trade restraints. This
major reallocation of regulatory authority undermined the robust
regime of competitive federalism that characterized pre-1948 regulation
of trade restraints.88 Many restraints were now subject to rules produced
by two sovereigns. Because the Sherman Act provided a regulatory floor,
states lacked incentives to generate innovative doctrinal approaches
less interventionist than Sherman Act doctrine.89 To be sure, states
remained free to impose more interventionist rules, condemning
conduct that courts treat as perfectly reasonable under the Sherman
Act. However, the prospect of aggressive state antitrust enforcement
policy has led to sporadic federal judicial invalidation of state antitrust
laws and calls for more such preemption.90 Indeed, Richard Posner has
called for preemption of all state antitrust regulation of conduct that
affects interstate commerce.91 Thus, state efforts to adopt intrusive
antitrust regulation vis-á-vis local restraints necessarily take place in the
shadow of possible federal reaction, further attenuating the sort of

88. See supra notes 17–22, 50–58 and accompanying text (explaining how preWickard regime allocated regulatory authority over trade restraints into mutually
exclusive domains, thereby supporting a robust regime of competitive federalism).
89. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and Commerce, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
935, 937 (2013) (asserting that competitive federalism can only induce optimal rules
if, inter alia, states can “select any set of laws they desire”); Alan J. Meese, Regulation of
Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or
Competition Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 85–86 (1999) (explaining
how states’ refusal to recognize other states’ rules governing intrastate conduct can
undermine incentives of latter states to generate optimal legal rules).
90. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (rejecting both the Sherman
Act challenge to the baseball reserve system and the application of state antitrust laws
because such laws “would conflict with federal policy” (i.e., the Court’s interpretation
of the Sherman Act) and burden interstate commerce); Major League Baseball v. Crist,
331 F.3d 1177, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Sherman Act preempted state
antitrust regulation of major league baseball).
91. See Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State
Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2004) (advocating such preemption);
see also Michael E. DeBow, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, 1–
2, 8 (Oct. 26, 2005) (advocating federal preemption of state antitrust laws and
limitations on state officials’ ability to invoke federal antitrust laws).
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incentives necessary to drive robust competition between the states.92
Perhaps because of this fear, a supermajority of states all but require
their courts to read their own antitrust statutes to replicate federal law.93
States do retain exclusive authority over conduct producing no
impact of any sort on interstate commerce, raising the prospect of
continued rivalry between states to generate doctrine governing such
restraints. However, the pervasive integration of the nation’s economy
has likely reduced the size of this category to a trivial portion of the
nation’s commerce, weakening states’ incentives to produce a separate
set of rules governing such restraints.94 Indeed, studies of state antitrust
activity conclude that most states bring few, if any, antitrust cases.95
While competition between the states to produce certain bodies of law
is alive and well,96 competitive federalism in antitrust is on life support
or worse, depriving society of the benefits of interjurisdictional rivalry.97
The revised allocation of regulatory authority and the prospect of
preemption was particularly salient with respect to restraints that states
themselves approved. Shortly after Wickard, the Supreme Court held
that state-approved restraints usually do not violate the Sherman Act.98
Subsequent decisions elaborating on this so-called “state action

92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining how depriving states of
exclusive authority over local conduct undermines incentives driving competitive
federalism).
93. See, e.g., Richard A. Duncan & Alison K. Guernsey, Waiting for the Other Shoe to
Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 174 (2008) (finding that
thirty-six states have stated intent to “adhere strongly” or “moderately strongly” to
federal antitrust precedent when implementing their own antitrust laws).
94. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 1012 (5th ed. 2016) (stating that the Sherman Act now reaches “almost
any market or transaction with more than a trivial impact on interstate commerce”).
95. See Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, The Determinants of State-Level
Antitrust Activity, 37 REV. INDUS. ORGANIZATIONS 179, 189 (2010) (explaining that seven
states brought no antitrust cases between 1992 and 2006 and that many states brought
no cases in most years).
96. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6, 12, 15
(1993) (contending that competition between states for corporate charters has induced
production of corporate law superior to that which a national regime would produce).
97. Cf. Feinberg & Reynolds, supra note 95, at 189 (characterizing the lack of state
antitrust enforcement in recent years); supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing
benefits of interjurisdictional competition in the production of antitrust doctrine).
98. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345, 352 (1943) (rejecting Sherman Act
challenge to state-imposed restriction on raisin output, over ninety percent of which
was exported in interstate commerce); id. at 351–52 (describing two exceptions to such
immunity).
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doctrine” conditioned immunity for state-sponsored restraints upon
states’ satisfaction of certain procedural requirements, including active
supervision by disinterested individuals of state-endorsed private
restraints.99 Failure to satisfy these requirements resulted in Sherman
Act preemption of such restraints, overriding states’ regulatory choices
and obscuring accountability for the adoption of anti-competitive
regulation.100 Nearly all decisions elaborating on these requirements
have involved intrastate restraints that affected interstate commerce only
fortuitously and were thus beyond the scope of the Act before 1948.101 As
one scholar explained, the state action doctrine is only necessary because
“the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of the commerce power.”102
The Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. FTC103 exemplifies the impact of the substantial effects test
on Sherman Act treatment of local, state-approved restraints. The
Federal Trade Commission challenged a horizontal conspiracy between
dentists on the state’s dental licensing board to define dentistry to
include teeth whitening, thereby excluding unlicensed individuals from
this occupation.104 The Commission did not assert that the Board’s
99. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 503–15 (2015)
(rejecting state action immunity because state did not actively supervise self-interested
regulators); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 639–40 (1992) (rejecting such
immunity because agency did not adequately supervise private actors authorized to fix
prices); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105,
114 (1980) (holding that compliance with California statute requiring parties to enter
minimum resale price maintenance agreements violated the Sherman Act because
state failed to properly supervise and review resulting wholesale wine prices).
100. See, e.g., N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 513–15; Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 639–
40; Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 113–14.
101. See, e.g., N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 500–02 (agreement between dentists
providing local services); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 219–
20 (2013) (merger between local hospitals); Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 624–25
(price fixing by local title insurers); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc.,
499 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1991) (monopolization of metropolitan billboard market);
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 261 (1986) (municipal rent control); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977) (ban on intrastate lawyer advertising);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581 (1976) (state-approved requirement
that public utility’s customers also purchase light bulbs from the firm); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 644 (2006)
(characterizing Parker as the sole Supreme Court state action decision involving
restraint producing interstate harm).
102. See Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 41.
103. 574 U.S. 494 (2015).
104. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 574 U.S. 494 (2015). While the Commission brought the case under section 5 of
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conspiracy harmed those seeking teeth-whitening services outside of
North Carolina.105 The Court of Appeals determined that “the Board
successfully expelled non-dentist providers from the North Carolina
teeth-whitening market.”106
Nonetheless, the Commission found that federal antitrust law reached
such intrastate conduct, invoking fortuitous interstate impacts.107 For
instance, some unlicensed teeth-whiteners purchased inputs from other
states, and some forwarded cease-and-desist letters to out-of-state
creditors.108 The Commission held that the agreement violated the
federal antitrust laws because the state did not adequately supervise
self-interested individuals regulating the practice of dentistry.109 The
Supreme Court affirmed, albeit without addressing application of
federal law to this intrastate conspiracy.110 Thus, the decision left the
state free to adopt the very same harmful restraint, so long as unbiased
state officials signed off.111 Absent the post-1948 substantial effects test,
the conspiracy would have exceeded the reach of the Act, leaving North
Carolina and other states free to structure their regulatory processes
without Supreme Court oversight.
III. THE COURT’S EXPLANATION FOR CHANGE
Repudiation of several decades of precedent requires some explanation.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not offered a thorough or consistent
rationale for replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial

the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018), it invoked Sherman
Act case law to justify application of the FTC Act to the challenged local restraints. N.C.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 370–71.
105. See id.
106. Id.; see also N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 501 (offering similar
characterization).
107. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 75, 158 (2011) (finding that the
board’s actions have “a substantial effect on interstate commerce”).
108. Id. at 156 (citing Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744
(1976)) (invoking “[p]urchases by a defendant of out-of-state goods” to support a
finding that the conspiracy “substantially affects interstate commerce”).
109. See id. at 78, 86 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)).
110. See N.C. Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 515–16 (holding that “[the Sherman Act]
does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the unsupervised control of active
market participants,” with the result that state action immunity did not protect
challenged agreement).
111. See, e.g., id. at 503–15 (explaining “active supervision” requirements necessary
for application of state action immunity).
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effects test. Indeed, only one decision—Mandeville Island Farms—has
devoted more than a paragraph to explaining the vast expansion of the
Act vis-á-vis intrastate restraints.112
The relevant case law recounts three different considerations that
purportedly support the modern approach. First, the Court has
claimed that the 1890 Congress had a broader view of its commerce
power than that seemingly reflected in Commerce Clause precedents
the Court invoked when it first determined the Sherman Act’s reach.113
Thus, the Court has claimed that pre-1948 Sherman Act decisions
improperly invoked the jurisprudence of dual federalism in place
when Congress passed the Sherman Act and incorrectly treated state
and federal authority over trade restraints as mutually exclusive. Because
of these mistakes, pre-1890 decisions validating state regulations with
merely “indirect” impacts on interstate commerce erroneously fixed the
boundary between state and federal authority, thereby limiting
Congress’s power and the resulting reach of the Act.114 Early Sherman
Act decisions thus thwarted the purported will of Congress to exercise
the full extent of its commerce power, including concurrent authority
over local restraints that impacted interstate commerce indirectly.115
This assertion echoed Wickard’s critique of dual federalism as well as
Depression-era academics who had claimed that pre-1890 precedents
recognized congressional authority to regulate conduct affecting
112. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229–
33 (1948).
113. See id. at 229–30; infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
114. Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229 n.8 (concluding that United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and progeny erroneously embraced “[Chief
Justice] Marshall’s idea of the mutual exclusiveness of state and national power in this
area and ignor[ed] the later evolution of different conceptions in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, [53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)]”); id. at 229 (asserting that E.C. Knight
invoked “mechanical distinctions with substantially nullifying effects” on the coverage
of the commerce power and the Act); id. at 229 n.8 (criticizing E.C. Knight and progeny
for relying upon terms of art deriving from Commerce Clause cases assessing the
validity of state, not federal, statutes); United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 545 (1944) (“[L]egal formulae devised to uphold state power cannot uncritically
be accepted as trustworthy guides to determine Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.”).
115. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229; Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at
544–45 (rejecting decisions holding that insurance is not commerce because such
decisions involved Commerce Clause challenges to state law); id. at 558 (contending
that Congress meant to exercise the full extent of its commerce power); see also supra
notes 86–87 and accompanying text (discussing additional decisions reaching
identical conclusions).
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interstate commerce.116 To support this claim, the Court has asserted
that there is no support for dual federalism in the statute’s legislative
history.117
Second, the Court has claimed that the scope of the Act expands
“along with expanding notions of Congressional power.”118 Such
expansion, it is said, effectuates Congress’s desire to go “as far as the
Constitution permits” by exercising the “utmost extent of its Constitutional
power” when enacting the statute.119 Thus, even if the Court at first properly
held that Congress embraced dual federalism, mutual exclusivity, and the
direct/indirect standard, the scope of the Act supposedly expands
along with expansion of Congress’s commerce power, in whatever
context. The Court’s invocation of Wickard’s substantial effects test—
an entirely new standard governing the scope of the commerce
power—in Mandeville Island Farms exemplifies this approach.120 Here
again, the Court has invoked legislative history in support of this
contention.121

116. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1942) (contending that E.C.
Knight incorrectly treated decisions validating state laws as establishing limits on
congressional power); see also E.S. Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 151, 164–65 (1936) (contending that pre-1890 decisions recognized
concurrent congressional authority over intrastate conduct affecting interstate
commerce indirectly and characterizing E.C. Knight as the first decision to the
contrary); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 1335, 1356 (1934) (concluding that decisions validating state authority did not
limit congressional authority).
117. See infra notes 422–30 and accompanying text.
118. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 n.8 (1991); McLain v. Real
Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (recounting how expansion
of the Sherman Act has tracked expansion of the scope of the commerce power);
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
119. Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 328 n.7, 329 n.10 (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1167
(1889)) (concluding that Congress intended the Sherman Act to reach “as far as the
Constitution permits”); Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 558 (“Congress wanted to go
to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly
agreements.”); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974)
(quoting Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 558) (same); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 495 (1940)) (same).
120. See Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 229–31; see also McLain, 444 U.S. at 241
(citing Hosp. Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 743) (invoking Wickard to exemplify the breadth of the
commerce power and opining that the “reach of the Sherman Act” is “correspondingly
broad”).
121. See infra notes 422–23 and accompanying text.
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Third and finally, the Court has asserted that changes in technology,
commercial practices, and deepening integration of the national
economy have justified expanding Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause and the correlative reach of the Sherman Act.122
The Court has invoked similar grounds for expanding the commerce
power in other contexts.123
The first two claims are straightforward assertions about the original
meaning of the statute, i.e., the legal standard that Congress chose to
define the Act’s reach and the appropriate evolution of that standard in
response to expansion of the commerce power. Scholars can evaluate
these assertions using conventional tools of statutory interpretation. The
third claim takes the direct/indirect standard animating the original text
as a given and justifies rejection of that standard as a response to factual
changes exogenous to the Act. Adoption of the substantial effects test thus
constitutes a “translation” of unchanged text in response to changes in
factual context.124 Under this approach, sometimes known as “two-step

122. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 328–29 (“[A]s the dimensions and
complexity of our economy have grown, the federal power over commerce, and the
concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act, have experienced similar expansion.”);
McLain, 444 U.S. at 241 (“During the near century of Sherman Act experience, forms and
modes of business and commerce have changed along with changes in communication
and travel, and innovations in methods of conducting particular businesses have altered
relationships in commerce. Application of the Act reflects an adaptation to these
changing circumstances.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975)
(applying the Act to local price fixing by lawyers because: “[i]n the modern world it
cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial
intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on
commerce”); Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 230 (stating that the “evolving nature
of our industrialism” condemned E.C. Knight and progeny); cf. Andrew I. Gavil,
Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
657, 691 (1993) (citing these decisions for the proposition that “Congress intended to
fill the void left by the states” and thereby “exercise all of the commerce power that it
possessed . . . and to permit that power to grow with the times”).
123. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“The volume of
interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted objects of government
regulation have, however, expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory
authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate commerce has
become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on
the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’[s]
commerce power.”).
124. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1189 (1993)
(suggesting that while one-step originalism is blind to the current context, two-step
originalism considers that context and still preserves original meaning). This author
recognizes that originalism is a controversial methodology. However, the Court itself
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originalism,” changing context may require evolved application of an
unchanged text, producing results that, while inconsistent with Congress’s
subjective expectations, nonetheless constitute faithful application of the
enactment’s original meaning and the legislature’s normative choices.125
Proponents of original meaning methodology have embraced such
interpretive translation.126 Moreover, the Sherman Act is no stranger
to this approach. The foundational decision in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States,127 which announced section 1’s “Rule of Reason,”
requires judges to implement the “public policy” of the Act by
determining whether agreements create “monopoly” or “the results of
monopoly.”128 Judicial assessments of particular restraints can evolve over
time, reflecting “more accurate economic conceptions” regarding the
impact of such agreements.129 Courts applying section 1 have accordingly
altered application of the Act in light of evolving economic theory and
conditions.130 By invoking factual changes to justify the substantial effects
has invoked the intent of Congress and claimed that pre-1948 jurisprudence thwarted
that intent.
125. Id. at 1184 (“If the original and current contexts differ, then the meaning of
the same application in the two contexts may differ as well.”).
126. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–62, 62 n.1 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that judges should apply the normative choices
inherent in the Fourth Amendment in light of modern technology, including
“helicopters and telephones”); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (“We must never hesitate to apply old values to new
circumstances, whether those circumstances are changes in technology or changes in
the impact of traditional common law actions.”).
127. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
128. See id. at 61 (equating “restraint of trade” with “monopoly and the acts which
produce the same result as monopoly”).
129. Id. at 55 (approving evolving treatment of particular restraints after
“development of more accurate economic conceptions and the changes in conditions of
society”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (stating
that the term “restraint of trade” does not refer to specific types of agreements but
instead to “a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances”); id. at 732 (“The
Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.”).
130. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 48 (1966) (highlighting the judicial responsibility and “awesome task” of
applying the Sherman Act in light of the judge’s understanding of both current
economic theories and “requirements of the judicial process”); Alan J. Meese, Price
Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 90–91 (2003)
(explaining how Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason requires courts to evaluate restraints in
light of evolving economic theory); id. at 141–44 (describing evolution of various
antitrust doctrines as translations); see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 802–04 (1965) (stating
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test, the Court has seemingly embraced the translation methodology
that informs Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason.131
No Supreme Court opinion has performed a comprehensive
assessment of the original public meaning of the term “restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States” and thus the reach of the statute
vis-á-vis intrastate restraints.132 Scholarly commentary on the question
is incomplete.133 The balance of this Article fills this void, conducting
a de novo assessment of the phrase’s meaning using conventional tools
of statutory construction—namely, the plain meaning of the text,
informed by canons of construction. This assessment, in turn, facilitates
evaluation of the Court’s three-fold explanation for its substitution of
the substantial effects test for the direct/indirect standard. The
assessment of the statute’s original meaning begins with an exposition
of the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the backdrop
of the congressional debate that preceded enactment of the Sherman
Act. This jurisprudence, it will be seen, sheds important light on the
original meaning of the Act.

that Standard Oil required courts to “perform[] economic analysis to determine in
which acts and agreements the evils of monopoly were present”); Lessig, supra note
124, at 1247–50 (same).
131. See Meese, supra note 130, at 91–92 (explaining how modern courts have
adjusted antitrust doctrine in light of evolving economic theory).
132. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, the Court examined whether
the original meaning of “commerce” included “insurance.” See 322 U.S. 533, 538–39,
545–53 (1944). The Court (properly) assumed that the challenged agreements
“restrained” the insurance trade “among the several States” and thus did not examine
the meaning of these two phrases. See id. at 553.
133. For instance, two scholars make the normative case that the Act should only
reach conduct producing harm in a geographic market exceeding one state’s
boundaries. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 446–49. They also reject the
direct/indirect test as such. See id. at 445. They do not, however, employ conventional
tools of statutory construction to assess the original meaning of “in restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States” or answer the Court’s justifications for the
substantial effects test. They do discuss statements by Senator Sherman as probative
regarding the meaning of the statute. See id. at 450–51; cf. infra Part VI (discussing the
legislative history of the Act). Another scholar defends the current regime without
engaging the canons of construction and other sources of meaning identified here.
See generally Gavil, supra note 122.
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IV. THE COMMERCE POWER IN 1890
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.”134 Gibbons v. Ogden135 offered the foundational
account of the clause’s meaning.136 Gibbons defined “commerce” to include
“the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
its branches.”137 Such intercourse included navigation as well as “traffic,”
“buying and selling,” and “the interchange of commodities.”138 The power
to “regulate” such commerce entailed the power “to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed.”139
Gibbons also rejected claims that the Commerce Clause empowered
Congress to regulate commerce confined to one state.140 “The genius
and character of the whole government,” as well as the language of the
clause, established that Congress could regulate “all the external concerns
of the nation,” along with “those internal concerns which affect the States
generally,” but could not govern “those which are completely within a
particular State [and] which do not affect other States.”141 Empowering
Congress to regulate intrastate commerce, the Court said, would be
“inconvenient” and was “certainly unnecessary.”142 Thus, “[t]he completely
internal” commerce of the state, “carried on between man and man in a
State . . . . [, was] reserved for the State itself.”143
Subsequent decisions elaborated on the rationale for the allocation
of authority prescribed by Gibbons, articulating an anti-favoritism
principle informing the Commerce Clause and thus the boundary
between state and national power. Before the Constitution, the Court
said, interstate commerce was in an “oppressed and degraded state,”
because of a “helpless, inadequate Confederation.”144 The Framers and
134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
135. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
136. Canonical decisions treat Gibbons as a definitive exposition of the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251, 253–55 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111,120, 122 (1942); Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,
351 (1914).
137. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–90.
138. Id. at 189.
139. Id. at 196.
140. Id. at 194–95 (evaluating this argument).
141. Id. at 195.
142. Id. at 194.
143. Id. at 194–95.
144. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1879); see Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275, 280 (1875) (referring to the poor economic conditions under the Articles of
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Ratifiers abandoned the Confederation, the Court said, and instituted
a national government “with full power over the entire subject of
[interstate] commerce.”145 The Commerce Clause ensured “a perfect
equality amongst the several States as to commercial rights, and . . .
prevent[ed] unjust and invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local
and partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.”146 The
clause prevented states from “accomplish[ing], by indirection, what the
State could not accomplish by a direct tax, viz., build[ing] up its domestic
commerce by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry
and business of other States.”147 This oft-cited rationale148 implied that
the object of the clause was to authorize Congress to preempt partial
state legislation that burdened interstate trade and enriched one state’s
Confederation that induced adoption of the Constitution); State Tonnage Tax Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1870) (“Prior to the adoption of the Constitution the
States attempted to regulate commerce . . . and it was the embarrassments growing out
of such regulations and conflicting obligations which mainly led to the abandonment
of the Confederation and to the more perfect union . . . .”); Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The oppressed and degraded state
of commerce previous to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten.”);
see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 224 (Johnson, J., concurring) (noting that states’
pursuit of self-interest “began to show itself in iniquitous laws and impolitic measures,
from which grew up a conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony
of the States”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1054 (Hiliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“The oppressed and degraded state of
commerce . . . [under the Confederation] can scarcely be forgotten. . . . Those[] who
felt the injury . . . perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important
subject to a single government.”); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the
Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 598–601 (1994)
(describing how states imposed export and import taxes to the detriment of other
states during this era).
145. Guy, 100 U.S. at 440.
146. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852).
147. Guy, 100 U.S. at 443.
148. Id. at 442 (explaining that the Commerce Clause preempts “local regulations,
having for their object to secure exclusive benefits to the citizens and products of
particular States”); see, e.g., County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880)
(asserting that Commerce Clause doctrine provides “security against conflicting
regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and
citizens, and against the products and citizens of other States”); S.S. Co. v.
Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 33 (1867) (same); Veazie, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 574;
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“[The] object riding over
every other in the adoption of the constitution . . . was to keep the commercial
intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.”); id. at 225
(discussing how under the Confederation “interference of partial and separate
regulations” led to “animosities . . . among the several States”).
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citizens at the expense of others.149 Gibbons itself sustained a federal statute
preempting New York’s grant of a monopoly over navigation between
New Jersey and New York that favored New York producers over New
Jersey consumers.150
This anti-favoritism rationale also implied limits on the clause’s reach.
Regulation of intrastate commerce producing no out-of-state harm could
not be “partial,” discriminate against another state’s citizens, or protect a
state’s industries from out-of-state competition. To quote Gibbons, federal
authority over such local subjects “would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary,” presumably because states possessed appropriate incentives
to regulate such conduct.151
Gibbons also suggested that the commerce power was exclusive within
portions of its domain and thus would invalidate state obstructions to
interstate commerce, even absent congressional legislation.152 The
Court implemented this dicta in 1851, spawning what modern courts
call the “dormant Commerce Clause.”153 Without employing the term
“dormant Commerce Clause,” the Court constructed a doctrine of
implied preemption, invalidating most state regulations of interstate
commerce even absent any congressional action.154
The Court divided interstate commerce into two “subjects.”155 Some were
“national in their character” and/or demanded a uniform system of
national regulation.156 Others, while connected to interstate commerce and
thus within Congress’s power, were nonetheless “local” or “mere aids to
commerce,” and were best suited to decentralized regulation by individual

149. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1101–02 (explaining that this jurisprudence
rested on a “free-trade” construction of the Commerce Clause).
150. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210–15.
151. Id. at 194.
152. See id. at 198–200.
153. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Cushman,
supra note 20, at 1102, 1107–20. The phrase “dormant Commerce Clause” first
appeared in a dissenting opinion in 1945. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S.
538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Previously, the Court had occasionally
referred to the commerce power as “dormant,” without referencing a “dormant
Commerce Clause.” See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
245, 252 (1829) (referring to “the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state”).
154. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 325 (1851) (explaining
that Commerce Clause ipso facto invalidated some state regulation).
155. Cushman, supra note 20, at 1110–12, 1110 n.104.
156. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) (explaining that the
subjects of Commerce Clause regulation require “different plans or modes of
treatment”); Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318–20.
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states better attuned to the “special circumstances and localities” of the
subject.157
The result was a quasi-statutory regime that employed two default
rules to discern the implied will of Congress. Where a subject was
national in character or demanded uniform regulation, the Court read
congressional silence as equivalent to legislation preempting state statutes
that “regulated” such subjects, because such legislation exercised a power
exclusively granted to Congress.158 The result, the Court said, was “perfect
freedom of commercial intercourse between the several States,”159 “liberty
of trade,”160 and “free and untrammelled” interstate commerce.161 State
regulation was “repugnant to such freedom,” which remained the default
status unless Congress authorized interference with interstate commerce.162
Where, however, a subject did not demand national regulation but
nonetheless fell within the commerce power, state and national power
were coextensive. This category had a “limited scope.”163 By default,
states could regulate such subjects absent congressional legislation,

157. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319–20 (stating that
regulation of harbor pilotage must take diverse forms to “meet the local necessities of
navigation”).
158. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109–10 (1890) (“Whenever, however, a
particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised
by it, and Congress remains silent, . . . the only legitimate conclusion is that the general
government intended that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action
of the States cannot be permitted to effect that which would be incompatible with such
intention. Hence, inasmuch as interstate commerce . . . is national in its character, and
must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to
regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such
commerce shall be free and untrammelled.”); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S.
465, 482 (1888) (same); see also Cushman, supra note 20, at 1101–11 (discussing
additional cases).
159. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1880) (invalidating tax on reselling
goods imported from other states).
160. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 498 (characterizing state laws that impermissibly regulate
interstate commerce as “a breach and interruption of that liberty of trade which
[C]ongress ordains as the national policy”).
161. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875); see also Brown v. Houston, 114
U.S. 622, 631 (1885) (holding that Congressional silence established that interstate
commerce should be “free and untrammelled” from challenged state tax).
162. See Bowman, 125 U.S. at 495.
163. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1115; infra notes 318–27 and accompanying text
(describing Addyston Pipe’s determination that direct restraints of interstate commerce
were an inherently national subject reserved for Congress).
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provided such state legislation did not also regulate other subjects of
interstate commerce that were inherently national.164
The Court defined as “national in [their] character,” the subjects of
“transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities”
between the states.165 Thus, states could not prevent out-of-state firms
from selling products via independent retailers or traveling salespeople,166
tax vendors that sold out-of-state goods,167 regulate rates for interstate
transportation,168 tax the presence of interstate railroads or sleeping cars
leased to railroads,169 or require telegraph companies to hand-deliver
interstate messages.170 Regulation of these subjects presented states
with opportunities to favor their own citizens at the expense of others.
Congressional silence resulted in preemption of state regulation of
these subjects, preventing self-interested, partial legislation.171 By
contrast, local subjects characterized by overlapping jurisdiction
included harbors, buoys, bridges, or pilotage.172
By 1875, then, potential subjects of commercial regulation fell into
three categories: (1) intrastate commerce beyond Congress’s authority
and thus subject to exclusive state regulation; (2) interstate commerce
that was inherently national or required a uniform system of regulation

164. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) (describing
coextensive state and federal power over such subjects).
165. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880); Tiernan v. Rinker, 102
U.S. 123, 126 (1880).
166. Welton, 91 U.S. at 282 (invalidating tax on traveling vendors selling out-of-state
products because “the main object of [interstate] commerce is the sale and exchange
of [interstate] commodities”).
167. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887)
(invalidating tax on dealers representing out-of-state manufacturers); Webber v.
Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350 (1880) (same); see also Charles W. McCurdy, American Law
and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 638
(1978). Professor Barry Cushman collects numerous decisions invalidating state
regulation of subjects of “national character” in his excellent work Formalism and
Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000), from which I
have taken most of these pre-1890 examples.
168. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 561–63 (1886).
169. See Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 117–18 (1890); Pickard v.
Pullman S. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 44, 46 (1886).
170. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887).
171. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text (explaining the anti-favoritism
rationale of the Commerce Clause).
172. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696–99 (1880) (rejecting
Commerce Clause challenge to state harbor dredging); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (rejecting challenge to pilotage fees).
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and thus subject exclusively to congressional regulation; and (3) interstate
commerce subject to concurrent state and federal regulation. This body of
Commerce Clause doctrine later became known as “dual federalism.”173
Given the Court’s definitions of “commerce,” “among the several
States,” and “inherently national,” the boundaries between these three
categories were reasonably clear.174 Still, some otherwise valid state
regulation of intrastate activities, while apparently within the first
category, could also affect interstate commerce, raising the possibility
under Gibbons that such statutes also regulated inherently national
subjects and thus fell into the second category.175 Implementation of
dual federalism required the Court to determine whether such effects
constituted “regulation” of an inherently national subject. This, in
turn, required the Court to determine the affirmative scope of the
commerce power (i.e., the power to “regulate”) over intrastate activities
that affected interstate commerce and the resulting boundary between
state and federal authority.
There was, however, little express federal commercial regulation
during this era. Nearly all decisions opining on the scope of Congress’s
authority involved challenges to state legislation that allegedly regulated
subjects of interstate commerce.176 Moreover, independent territorial
limitations on state authority prevented states from regulating activities
beyond their borders.177 Thus, most such challenges consisted of claims
that otherwise permissible regulation of intrastate activity nonetheless
also regulated inherently national subjects of interstate commerce.178
Resolution of such claims required the Court to ascertain whether
Congress had authority over the subject and, if so, whether the

173. See Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce—A Crucial
Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 481 (1933) (coining this phrase).
174. No one doubted, for instance, that state regulation of interstate railway
transportation was invalid.
175. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (opining that Commerce
Clause empowered Congress to regulate where commerce “affect[ed] other States”).
176. In addition to Gibbons, another exception was the Trade-Mark Cases, which held
that Congress lacked authority to regulate trademarks used only in intrastate
commerce. 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879).
177. See James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1509, 1516–19 (2008) (“Every significant attribute of legislative power available
to states was territorially circumscribed [in the mid-late nineteenth century.]”).
178. Cf. Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (“[S]tate
legislation, however legitimate in its origin or object, when it conflicts with the positive
legislation of [C]ongress, or its intention, reasonably implied from its silence, in
respect to the subject of [interstate] commerce . . . must fail.” (emphasis added)).
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challenged legislation in fact “regulated” this subject, exercising
authority exclusively held by Congress.
The Court recognized that various intrastate activities affected
interstate commerce.179 Still, so long as the impact of these activities—
and state regulation thereof—upon interstate commerce was “indirect,”
such laws did not “regulate” interstate commerce “in the constitutional
sense,”180 and the activities were beyond congressional power.181 Where,
however, such intrastate activity or the regulation thereof affected an
inherently national subject of interstate commerce directly, the
legislation regulated a subject exclusively reserved to Congress and was
thus implicitly preempted.182 This jurisprudence was no exercise in

179. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1888) (recognizing that a ban on
manufacturing reduced interstate commerce); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 481–
82 (1888) (intrastate locomotive operation); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876)
(grain storage fees).
180. R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878).
181. See, e.g., Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23 (quoting Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488
(1878)) (“‘[State] legislation . . . may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and
persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the
Constitution,’ unless . . . it ‘imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce,’ or
‘interferes directly with its freedom.’”); Smith, 124 U.S. at 482 (regulation of
qualifications of state’s locomotive engineers did not regulate interstate commerce
because it affected commerce “only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely, and not so
as to burden or impede [it]”); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1876)
(explaining that Congress could only preempt state laws that “operated directly upon
[interstate] commerce”); id. at 103 (“General legislation of this kind . . . is not open to
any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or inter-State
commerce.”). At least one New Deal scholar claimed that the Court’s pre-1890
jurisprudence recognized co-extensive state and federal authority over conduct that
indirectly affected interstate commerce. See supra note 116. However, decisions such as
Kidd depended upon the assumption that Congress lacked authority over such
conduct. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1121–24 (describing Kidd’s rationale); id. at
1117 (describing conduct that Congress could not reach despite indirect impact on
interstate commerce). Moreover, even if language in Kidd and similar decisions was
technically dicta confirmed by E.C. Knight, it is still possible that Congress meant to
embrace that dicta as its own understanding of the scope of the commerce power and
thus the Sherman Act. See infra notes 449–63, 478 and accompanying text (recounting
invocation of Commerce Clause decisions by Senators debating early versions of the
Act).
182. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating facially-neutral
meat inspection regime that “directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals,
whose meat is to be sold [by out-of-state firms] in Minnesota for human food”);
Sherlock, 93 U.S. at 102–03 (explaining that the Court would invalidate state regulation
as contrary to the Commerce Clause where “legislation created, in the way of tax,
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arid formalism183 but instead implemented the anti-favoritism principle
the Court believed animated the Commerce Clause, condemning
“partial legislation” that favored a state’s own products and citizens over
those of other states.184
This case law, consistent with the Court’s account of the clause’s
rationale, allocated legislative authority based upon the existence (or
not) of what economists would call “interstate economic spillover[s].”185
States retained authority over a category of conduct whenever they
internalized the full harms and benefits of legislation over that
subject.186 This category, which exceeded Congress’s reach, included
activities that produced incidental but harmless impacts on other
states.187 Thus, a regime of competitive federalism generated the rules
governing activities that produced no harmful interstate externalities.
Presumably such competition between sovereigns produced legal rules
superior to those a centralized unitary regime would have produced.188
license, or condition, a direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly
interfered with its freedom”).
183. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1091–93 (identifying scholars making this
argument).
184. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) (explaining the need
for congressional power to regulate commerce among the states because the states
would otherwise enact laws benefitting their own citizens at the expense of others).
185. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 405–06 (applying the anti-spillover
rationale to advocate a similar approach to Sherman Act jurisdiction); Richard A.
Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 12–14 (1987)
(explaining that the Commerce Clause empowers “Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce and thus to prevent states from imposing harmful externalities on
other states and to internalize beneficial externalities”).
186. See Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 437, 439 (1879) (describing the limits on
state authority); Hall, 95 U.S. at 487–88 (noting that states possess exclusive authority
over common carriers operating solely within their borders); State Tonnage Tax Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1870) (explaining that states retain authority over
commerce that is “completely internal and which does not extend to or affect other
States”); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573–75 (1852) (same); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (same).
187. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
188. Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 937 (“There is a powerful tendency toward
optimal legislation to the extent four conditions hold: (1) people and resources are
mobile; (2) the number of jurisdictions is substantial (no monopoly or oligopoly
power); (3) jurisdictions can select any set of laws they desire; and (4) all of the
consequences of one jurisdiction’s laws are felt by people who live in or consent to that
jurisdiction (in other words, no third party effects, often called externalities).”); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 89, 89 (2012) (stating that “robust interjurisdictional competition facilitates the
enactment of better public policy at the state level,” but only when states cannot
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Where states did not fully internalize the harms and benefits of an
activity, the Court’s jurisprudence allocated (exclusive) authority to
Congress.189 Thus, the Constitution “confide[d]” in Congress exclusive
authority over interstate railway rates and intrastate rates that directly
affected interstate rates because Congress’s “enlarged view of the
interests of all the States, and of the railroads concerned, better fits it
to establish just and equitable rules.”190 Such regulation, the Court said,
must be “of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and
wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations.”191 State regulation
of such rates necessarily produced extraterritorial harms and freeriding
on other states’ regulatory choices.192 The Commerce Clause thereby
prevented a race to the bottom and resulting suboptimal legislation with
respect to rules governing interstate commerce, while harnessing the
benefits of competition between the states with respect to intrastate
activity.193 The result was a “free-trade network,” with the Supreme
Court acting as an “umpire” invalidating laws that favored one state’s
citizens over others.194
The direct/indirect standard was just that—a standard—and thus
often entailed a fact-intensive assessment of the impact of particular

generate externalities); LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 557–65 (describing advantages of
decentralized production of legal rules where no externalities are present); Posner,
supra note 185, at 14 (describing benefits of competition between states absent
externalities); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 422 (1956). Some scholars have applied this logic in the antitrust context. See
Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 447–49 (describing theory of competitive
federalism); Easterbrook, supra note 58, at 33–35. See generally Meese, supra note 89.
189. See Hall, 95 U.S. at 489 (holding the Commerce Clause prevents states from
regulating interstate commerce “regardless of the interests of others”); Veazie, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) at 574 (noting that the Commerce Clause was aimed at combating
“invidious distinctions” among the states). One scholar has attributed to the Framers
an identical account of the commerce power, without discussing the Court’s
jurisprudence. See LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 607.
190. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
191. Id.
192. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937 159–64
(1991).
193. See LeBoeuf, supra note 144, at 570–92 (explaining how interstate externalities
can cause a legislative race to the bottom).
194. McCurdy, supra note 167, at 648 (explaining that between 1875 and 1890, the
Court “monitor[ed] the free-trade unit in the silence of Congress”); see also Cushman,
supra note 20, at 1107 & n.96 (collecting sources showing that the Court “played a
critical, instrumental role in opening a national market” by using the Commerce
Clause to invalidate “parochial legislation”).
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legislation.195 Application of this standard was presumably susceptible
to changes in surrounding factual circumstances that influenced
whether an impact was direct or indirect.196 Indeed, in 1877, the Court
opined that the power over commerce “keep[s] pace with the progress
of the country, and adapt[s] [itself] to the new developments of time
and circumstances.”197
V. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “RESTRAINT OF . . . COMMERCE
AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES” AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts “in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States.”198 The phrase “restraint
of trade” denotes the Act’s substantive content—i.e., the category of
agreements that produce the sort of harm the statute condemns.199
However, agreements that produce such harm only offend section 1 if
they also restrain “commerce among the several States.”200 The quoted
phrase allocates authority over harmful agreements between states and
the nation.201 Drawing on Part IV’s exposition of pre-1890 Commerce
195. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating meat
inspection regime despite facial neutrality and plausible police power purpose after a
fact-intensive determination that the regime’s “necessary operation . . . directly”
burdened interstate commerce); Wabash, 118 U.S. at 571 (“The line which separates
the powers of the States from this exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly
marked, and oftentimes . . . . it would be a useless task to . . . fix an arbitrary rule . . . .
It is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view
of the particular rights involved.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992)
(distinguishing legal standards from rules and explaining that standards entail “direct
application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation” and “allow the
decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances”); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70 (1911)
(analogizing the Rule of Reason to judicial application of the direct/indirect
standard); id. at 60 (concluding that the Sherman Act “indubitably contemplate[ed]
and requir[ed] a standard” i.e., the Rule of Reason, to determine whether agreements
restrained trade).
196. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 195, at 58–59 (noting that standards do not “tie[] the
decisionmaker’s hand[s]” as much as rules because “the more facts one may take into
account, the more likely that some of them will be different the next time”).
197. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
199. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51–60.
200. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s
interpretation of the Act as allocating mutually exclusive authority to states and the
federal government over different types of trade restraints). But see supra notes 69–72,
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Clause jurisprudence, this Part examines whether the “substantial
effects” test faithfully implements the original meaning of this limiting
phrase. In particular, this Part evaluates the Court’s three rationales
for replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects
test: (1) that Congress meant to reach restraints beyond the authority
implied by pre-1890 dual federalism jurisprudence; (2) that the Act
properly expands whenever the commerce power expands; and (3)
that changed economic circumstances justify the new test.
A. Did Congress Reject the Court’s Pre-1890 Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence?
The Supreme Court has sometimes claimed that the 1890 Congress
rejected pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, hoping instead to
reach intrastate restraints that indirectly affected interstate commerce.202
Analysis of this claim about the original meaning of the Act must begin
with the plain language of the statute: “restraint of . . . commerce
among the several States.”
“Among the several States” is clear enough. Since Gibbons, the Court
has repeatedly equated “among” with “between,” precluding Congress
from regulating commerce within a state.203 The substantial effects test
incorporates this assumption, asking as it does whether an intrastate
restraint affects commerce between two or more states.204 The meaning
of “restrain,” however, is less obvious. Contemporary dictionaries defined
“restraint” as “[t]hat which restrains, as a law, prohibition and the like.”205
These same sources suggest several definitions of “restrain,” including
“limit,” “hold back,” “check,” “hinder from unlimited enjoyment,” or “curb,”
perhaps capturing conduct that, while intrastate, nonetheless impacts,

88–93 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s adoption of the “substantial
effects” test, thereby creating a category of restraints over which states and the federal
government had overlapping jurisdiction).
202. See Cushman, supra note 20, at 1125.
203. See supra notes 136–38, 140 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1967) (per curiam).
205. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1128
(Chauncey A. Goodrich et al. eds., London, George Bell & Sons 1886) (defining
“restraint” as “[t]hat which restrains, as a law, a prohibition, and the like; limitation;
restriction”); see also JAMES STORMONTH, ETYMOLOGICAL AND PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 525 (Edinburgh & London, William Blackwood & Sons
1882) (defining “restraint” as “the act of restraining; abridgment of liberty; restriction;
hindrance of will; repression; that which restrains”).
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“influences,” or “affects” interstate commerce.206 The term could also
mean “confine,” “restrict,” “bind fast,” “repress,” or “abridge.”207
Because the plain meaning of “restraint” is ambiguous, courts and
scholars would next turn to canons of construction.208 Three canons
recommend themselves here. First, there is the avoidance canon.
Courts faced with different possible meanings of a statute reject the
alternative that poses constitutional difficulties.209 The canon rests
upon the presumption that Congress does not intentionally pass
legislation that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional.210
The Court applied this canon numerous times before 1890.211
This canon counsels rejection of broader readings of “restraint.” By
1890, the Court had repeatedly rejected claims that all state regulations
of intrastate activity affecting interstate commerce thereby “regulated”
such commerce “in a constitutional sense,” opining that such regulations
exceeded the scope of the commerce power.212 Instead, the Court said,
the commerce power only reached state regulations of intrastate activity
that affected interstate commerce “directly.”213 Thus, reading the
206. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
205, at 1128 (defining “restrain” as “to draw back again; to hold back; to check,” “[t]o
limit; to confine; to restrict,” and “to hinder from unlimited enjoyment; to abridge.”);
STORMONTH, supra note 205, at 525 (defining “restrain” as “to hold back; to bind fast;
to curb; to repress; to limit; to abridge”).
207. WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 205, at
1128; STORMONTH, supra note 205, at 525.
208. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 109–10 (2010) (describing how canons facilitate determination of original
meaning of texts).
209. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (describing the avoidance
canon as “a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a
statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”); United States ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”).
210. Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.
211. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 269 (1886) (“[A] statute must be
interpreted so as, if possible, to make it consistent with the Constitution and the
paramount law.”); Grenada Cty. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 268–69 (1884)
(citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 184–85 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company 1880)) (same).
212. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23 (1888); supra notes 179–81 and
accompanying text.
213. See Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating state police
regulation directly obstructing interstate commerce); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23 (quoting

2020] ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 117
Sherman Act to reach intrastate “restraints of trade” simply because
such agreements—or state regulation of them—also produce a
“substantial” fortuitous effect on interstate commerce would create “grave
and doubtful constitutional questions”214 under pre-1890 jurisprudence,
and thus militates against such a reading.
The avoidance canon itself offers no affirmative account of statutory
meaning and thus no alternative to the substantial effects test. However,
a second canon—the prior construction canon—may provide such an
account.215 This canon provides that, when Congress employs verbal
formulations that have obtained meaning in other contexts—including
interpretation of related texts—courts give statutory terms that preexisting meaning, unless context clearly indicates otherwise.216 This
prior meaning of terms thereby functions as a dictionary, clarifying
ambiguous statutory language.217 This is merely a manifestation of the
term of art canon, whereby courts give terms technical meanings they
have acquired in other contexts, even if such meanings contradict a
statute’s plain meaning.218
As Justice Frankfurter put it:
Words of art bring their art with them. They bear the meaning of
their habitat whether it be a phrase of technical significance in the

Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1878)) (asserting that Congress may only
preempt state regulation affecting commerce that “‘imposes a direct burden upon
interstate commerce’ or ‘interferes directly with its freedom’”); supra note 182 and
accompanying text.
214. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408.
215. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 322–26 (2012) (“If a statute uses words or phrases that have already
received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or even
uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, they
are to be understood according to that construction.”).
216. See Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395 (1920) (“The law uses familiar
legal expressions in their familiar legal sense . . . .”).
217. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2465 (2003)
(“Textualism . . . recognizes that Congress may speak in legal shorthand, drawing on
established legal terms that have been refined through case-by-case application.”); see
also, e.g., Dir. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 126–27
(1995) (applying term of art canon in light of prior interpretations of statutory term).
218. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 215, at 324 (citation omitted) (explaining that
when a term has been “authoritatively interpreted by a high court . . . the term bears
this same meaning[] [because] [t]he term has acquired . . . a technical legal sense that
should be given effect in the construction of later-enacted statutes”); see id.
(concluding that this result implements term of art canon); id. at 73–77 (explaining
how term of art canon facilitates determination of text’s ordinary meaning).
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scientific or business world, or whether it be loaded with the recondite
connotations of feudalism . . . . The peculiar idiom of business or of
administrative practise often modifies the meaning that ordinary
speech assigns to language. And if a word is obviously transplanted from
another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it
brings the old soil with it.219

Courts have taken exactly this approach when discerning the
meaning of “restraint of trade.”220 Most notably, in Standard Oil, the
Court determined that the term had a well-understood meaning in
statutory law, common law, and constitutional sources as referring only to
“unreasonable” restraints.221 These same sources supplied the meaning of
the term “reasonable,” treating as “unreasonable” agreements producing
monopoly or the results of monopoly.222 These sources supplied a
dictionary the Court employed to determine the meaning of a statutory
term of art.223
This second canon suggests an alternative meaning for the phrase “in
restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” and a meaning that,
unlike the substantial effects test, would have passed constitutional
muster in 1890. The source of meaning is not the common law, but
instead the case law comprising the pre-1890 quasi-statutory regime
implementing Congress’s presumed intent vis-á-vis state enactments
affecting interstate commerce.
Unlike “commerce” and “among the several States,” the term
“restraint” does not appear in the Commerce Clause or, for that matter,
the Constitution itself.224 Nonetheless, one finds hints about the meaning
of the term in Gibbons and contemporaneous materials. For instance,
concurring in Gibbons, Justice William Johnson opined that the “one
object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, . . . was
to keep commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious
219. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
527, 537 (1947).
220. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406, 408
(1911) (invoking common law to support conclusion that vertical price fixing
agreements were “in restraint of trade”); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (canvassing pre-Sherman Act common law to
determine section 1’s meaning), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
221. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50–62, 64 (1911).
222. Id. at 61–64.
223. Standard Oil invoked other considerations as well. See Alan J. Meese, Standard
Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2012) (explaining that the
Court read the Act to avoid banning agreements protected by liberty of contract).
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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and partial restraints.”225 During the same year, President James Monroe
described the scope of the commerce power, asserting that, under the
Articles of Confederation, “States individually had commenced a system
of restraint on each other whereby the interests of foreign powers were
promoted at their expense.”226 States victimized by such laws, he said,
immediately placed “[r]estraints . . . on such [interstate] commerce.”227
One year later, Justice Joseph Story, who had joined Gibbons and
other Marshall Court Commerce Clause decisions,228 offered a similar
account of the evils that motivated adoption of the clause.229 Under the
Articles of Confederation, Justice Story said, states regulated interstate
and international commerce “under the stimulating influence of local
interests, and the desire [for] undue gain.”230 Justice Story repeated
verbatim President Monroe’s assertion that “states individually
commenced a system of restraint upon each other, whereby the interests
of foreign powers were promoted at their expense.”231 The “contracted
policy in some of the states was soon counteracted by others,” Justice
Story said, and “[r]estraints were immediately laid on such commerce by
the suffering states; and thus a state of affairs disorderly and unnatural
grew up, the necessary tendency of which was to destroy the union
itself.”232 Finally, in the License Cases,233 Chief Justice Taney referred to
states’ intrastate regulation of alcohol consumption as “regulating and
restraining the traffic” in such “ardent spirits” but sustained the measure
because the traffic in question was intrastate.234
The first three statements equated “restraints” of interstate commerce
with self-interested state legislation that injured out-of-state citizens,
producing what Justice Story called “a state of affairs disorderly and

225. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
226. James Monroe, Special Message to the House of Representatives Containing the Views of
the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 4, 1822) (emphasis added), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/special-message-the-house-representatives-containing-the-views-thepresident-the-united [https://perma.cc/QH48-3WYG].
227. Id.
228. See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1.
229. See 3 STORY, supra note 144, § 1062.
230. Id. § 1066.
231. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Monroe, supra note 226).
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
234. Id. at 577.
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unnatural.”235 The fourth, by Chief Justice Taney, equated “restraint” with
“regulation.” None equated “restraint” with mere impact on commerce.
Aside from the opinions of Justice Johnson and Chief Justice Taney,
these materials may be insufficiently “legal” to satisfy the requirements
for application of the prior construction canon. However, subsequent
judicial decisions used the term “restraint” in the very same way. As
explained earlier, from the 1850s onward, the Court repeatedly held
that state enactments that “regulated” inherently national subjects of
interstate commerce contravened Congress’s implied will.236
Implementation of this quasi-statutory doctrine of implied preemption
required the Court to discern which state legislation “regulated” these
subjects of interstate commerce. Decisions conducting this inquiry
repeatedly emphasized that a mere impact on interstate commerce did
not constitute “regulation . . . in the constitutional sense.”237 Thus,
“regulation” was a term of art within this jurisprudence.
During the 1880s, the Court adjusted this verbal formulation, sometimes
employing the term “restraint” as synonymous with “regulation.” In Brown
v. Houston,238 for instance, the Court opined that a law taxing “every
wagon-load, or car-load . . . brought into [a] city” from other states
would be “a regulation of, and restraint upon, inter-State commerce” and thus
“an encroachment upon the exclusive powers of Congress.”239
Moreover, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois,240 the
Court declared that the Commerce Clause was intended to secure “the
right of continuous transportation from one end of the country to the
other” from “restraints which the State[s] might choose to impose upon
it.”241 During the same term, in Walling v. Michigan,242 the Court employed

235. 3 STORY, supra note 144, § 1062.
236. See, e.g., Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) (explaining that state
taxation of products manufactured in other states amounts to a regulation of
commerce); see also supra notes 158–72 and accompanying text (describing this case law).
237. See R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878) (“Many acts of a State may, indeed,
affect commerce, without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense
of the term.”); supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
238. 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
239. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
240. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
241. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added); see Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S.
465, 494 (1888) (quoting this language with approval); see also In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545,
560 (1891) (explaining that implied exercise of the commerce power preempts state
legislation functioning as a “restraint upon that perfect freedom which [Congress’s]
silence insured”).
242. 116 U.S. 446 (1886).
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a similar formulation, holding that a state’s “discriminating tax . . .
operating to the disadvantage of the products of other states . . . is, in
effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce among the states, and as such is
a usurpation of the [commerce] power.”243 Several inferior courts
employed the same formulation before and during this period.244
Shortly before passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court and
other courts—applying a quasi-statutory regime implementing the
supposed intent of Congress—had employed the phrase “restraint of
commerce among the several States” to describe state legislation governing
intrastate conduct that improperly “regulated” inherently national subjects
of interstate commerce.245 Such “regulation” contravened Congress’s
implied will that interstate commerce be “free and untrammelled.”246
These decisions were not obscure. Wabash, for instance, denied states the
authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates that directly impacted
interstate rates, thereby impelling creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.247 These decisions echoed previous similar usages of the

243. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
244. See Lang v. Lynch, 38 F. 489, 490 (C.C.D.N.H. 1889) (describing plaintiff’s
argument that “the statute is unconstitutional[] because it is a regulation in restraint
of commerce between the states”); Indiana ex rel. Wolf v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 16
F. 193, 199 (C.C.D. Ind. 1883) (invalidating state tax on out-of-state railroads because
the tax “amounts to a restraint or regulation of commerce between the states”); Phila.
& Havre de Grace Steam Tow-Boat Co. v. Phila., Wilmington & Balt. R.R., 19 F. Cas.
474, 476 (D. Md. 1856) (No. 11,085) (explaining that “no act of a state, which in any
way would seek to regulate, restrain or limit” interstate commerce can pass
constitutional muster unless enacted or sanctioned by Congress); People v. Raymond,
34 Cal. 492, 499–501 (1868) (invalidating state tax on carriage of passengers as a
“regulation of commerce” because “[i]ts undeniable tendency is to restrain
intercourse with foreign nations”); McGuire v. State, 42 Ohio St. 530, 532 (1885)
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to state alcohol regulation because “[i]t [did]
not seek to regulate or restrain the traffic in wine or any other specific property, as an
article of import or export”); id. at 534 (“This exclusive power to regulate commerce,
has reference to burdens or restraints imposed directly on the articles themselves . . .
.”); see also Lafarier v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Can., 24 A. 848, 850 (Me. 1892) (invalidating
legislation because it imposed a “meddlesome interference and restraint” on railroads
and thus improperly regulated interstate commerce).
245. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s definition of commerce).
246. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
247. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce:
An Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2171 (2015) (“Congress filled
the regulatory vacuum left by Wabash by passing the Interstate Commerce Act[, Pub.
L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887),] in 1887.”).
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term “restraint” by one President and three Supreme Court Justices.248
Thus, the term “restraint of . . . commerce” had received a previous
construction in a quasi-statutory body of law closely related to the
subject of the Sherman Act—regulation of interstate commerce.
When it chose the phrase “in restraint of . . . commerce among the
several States,” to define the category of agreements “in restraint of
trade” that were also subject to the Act, Congress “transplanted [this
phrase] from another legal source”: namely, the Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.249 The phrase thus brought “old soil with it.”250 This
“soil” presumably included the judicial standards distinguishing state
enactments that impermissibly “regulated” or “restrained” interstate
commerce from those that “affected” such commerce without “regulating”
it “in a constitutional sense.”251 As Justice Jackson put it when explaining
the rationale for this canon:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.252

By adopting this legal formula in a definition of private agreements,
Congress presumably incorporated a distinction, well-known to the
“judicial mind,” between intrastate agreements that “directly” affected
interstate commerce and those that merely affected such commerce
“indirectly.”253 Only the former constituted impermissible regulations and
thus “restraints” of interstate commerce under section 1.254 The latter,
248. See supra notes 225–34 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1850 sources
equating “restrain” with “regulate”).
249. See Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 537; cf. Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and
Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 2039–44 (2017) (canvassing some
of this evidence and taking a similar approach to discerning the meaning of “restraint
of trade” and thus the substantive content of the Act).
250. Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 537.
251. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing decisions holding that
implied exercise of the commerce power preempted state statutes that “regulated”
interstate commerce).
252. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
253. See supra notes 179–87 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s
repeated invocation of the direct/indirect distinction in its pre-1890 Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
254. Proponents of the modern approach might object that this second canon
replicates the avoidance canon, given this canon’s reliance upon Commerce Clause
precedent. However, application of the second canon does not turn on the source of
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even if “in restraint of trade,” did not impact interstate commerce in a
way that constituted regulation “in a constitutional sense.”255 This
meaning precludes application of the Act to intrastate restraints that
merely produce a (fortuitous) substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The resulting allocation of regulatory authority would reflect the
anti-favoritism principle that informed the Court’s overall distribution
of regulatory power between state and federal sovereigns.256 Thus,
states would retain exclusive authority over those restraints with
respect to which they internalized the costs and benefits of their
regulatory decisions, with competitive federalism generating doctrine
governing such restraints. However, the national government would
retain authority over restraints that threatened interstate harm and
thus raised the prospect that state regulation of such contracts would
produce self-interested or “partial” results, favoring the state’s citizens
at the expense of others.257
The third canon, contemporaneous judicial construction, also sheds
additional light on the meaning of “restraint of . . . Commerce.” The
Supreme Court has treated near-contemporaneous post-enactment
constructions of a legal text as pertinent indications of meaning.258 The
rationale for this canon is straightforward: judges sharing the legal
culture of the authors of a text are more likely to understand that text’s
meaning than those seeking that meaning decades later. While courts
should accord such precedents respect under the doctrine of stare
decisis, these contemporaneous constructions are also independently
probative evidence of the text’s original meaning.
The Court had several occasions shortly after 1890 to determine
when intrastate agreements were “in restraint of . . . commerce among
the verbal formulation Congress has borrowed. Thus, the same results would obtain if
the phrase “restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” had appeared in
decisions interpreting a previous federal statute.
255. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text (explaining the role that the
anti-favoritism principle played in the Court’s allocation of power between the states
and the federal government when implementing the Commerce Clause).
257. See infra notes 318–38 and accompanying text (describing Addyston Pipe’s
similar rationale for applying Act to direct restraints of interstate commerce).
258. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 610–14 (2008) (treating
post-enactment judicial constructions as probative evidence of constitutional
meaning); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 982, 985 (1991) (same); see also Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins., 127 U.S.
265, 297 (1888)) (explaining that contemporaneous construction of the Constitution
by the First Congress is “weighty evidence of its true meaning”).
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the several States.” First and most famously came United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., which involved a merger creating a Pennsylvania-based
monopoly in the national sugar market.259 The lead defendant’s corporate
charter stated that the firm was formed “for the purpose of importing,
manufacturing, refining and dealing in sugars and molasses.”260 Another
defendant, incorporated in New Jersey, acquired E.C. Knight and
other firms, the United States said, “to prevent and counteract the
effect of free competition” and “exact and procure large sums of
money from the citizens of Pennsylvania and from the citizens of
several States of the United States.”261
The Court conceded that the transaction could be “in restraint of
trade,” and thus invalid under state law.262 The Court acknowledged
that such a monopolistic restraint could impact both domestic and
interstate trade, because the newly-created firm would export sugar to
out-of-state purchasers.263 But did the merger restrain “commerce
among the several States?”
To answer this question, the Court referred to its pre-1890 Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, invoking decisions evaluating challenges to state
regulation of intrastate activity.264 These decisions established that such
an impact did not justify an affirmative exercise of the commerce

259. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2 (1895).
260. See Bill of Complaint at 3, United States v. E.C. Knight & Co., 60 F. 306 (E.D.
Pa. 1892) (No. 38).
261. Id. at 7–8.
262. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16.
263. Id. at 12 (“[T]he power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in
a certain sense the control of its disposition . . . .”).
264. Id. at 13–15 (discussing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Coe v. Errol, 116
U.S. 517 (1886); and Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852)). Neither Coe nor
Veazie expressly invoked the direct/indirect distinction, but other pre-Sherman Act
decisions did. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating
legislation directly restricting commerce in slaughtered animals); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888) (reviewing legislation requiring locomotive engineers to have
an Alabama license); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1878) (holding legislation
that acts upon business as it enters or leaves the state is a direct restraint); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that Illinois’s law setting maximum
warehouse fees did not directly encroach upon Congress’s commerce power);
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102–04 (1876) (holding that state’s imposition of tort
liability for accident occuring in state’s territorial waters did not directly burden
interstate commerce). Kidd, it should be noted, invoked Hall, Sherlock, Munn, and
Gibbons for the proposition that state police regulations only ran afoul of the
Commerce Clause if they affected interstate commerce directly. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 23.
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power.265 Citing Gibbons, the Court noted that state laws it invalidated under
the Commerce Clause had “direct[ly] interfere[d]” with, and thus “regulated,”
interstate commerce.266 These restrictions of production, whether by state
legislation or private agreement, merely affected such commerce in “a
secondary[,] and not the primary[,] sense . . . only incidentally and indirectly”
and thus did not “regulate” interstate commerce.267
The Sherman Act “was framed” with these “well-settled principles” in
mind.268 Congress did not seek to reach monopoly as such, recognizing
that intrastate production restraints merely impacted interstate
commerce indirectly and fell exclusively to the states.269 The
indictment in E.C. Knight alleged acts “related exclusively to the
acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries and the business of sugar
refining in Pennsylvania, and bore no direct relation to commerce
between the States.”270 There was no allegation that the defendants
intended to restrain interstate commerce.271 Thus, the Court implicitly
rejected the modern claim that Congress believed it possessed coextensive
authority over agreements that indirectly affected interstate commerce.272
Instead, the Court said, Congress embraced the direct/indirect standard
as defining the mutually exclusive boundary between state and federal
power.273 While Justice Harlan dissented, he embraced the direct/indirect
formulation but concluded that the merger would “directly affect”
interstate commerce.274

265. See E.C Knight, 156 U.S. at 13–15 (discussing pre-1890 Commerce Clause
decisions).
266. Id. at 15–16 (“In Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown v. Maryland, and other cases often
cited, the state laws [invalidated] were instances of direct interference with or
regulations of interstate or international commerce . . . .”).
267. See id. at 12, 16 (invoking Kidd for the proposition that banning manufacturing
within a state’s borders would “not . . . directly affect external commerce,” and that
“state legislation which, in a great variety of ways, affected interstate commerce . . . has
been frequently sustained because the interference was not direct”).
268. Id.
269. Id. (holding that Congress did not intend to reach the mere possession of a
monopoly by manufacturing corporations).
270. Id. at 17 (“The object was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the
commodity, but not through the control of interstate or foreign commerce.”).
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (describing this contention).
273. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17 (demonstrating Congress’s presumed adoption
of the direct/indirect standard to govern the scope of the Sherman Act).
274. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that the transaction “affects, not
incidentally, but directly, the people of all the States”).
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The Court reiterated this approach four times before 1900. These
opinions also articulated a tractable methodology for distinguishing
direct from indirect restraints, defining as “direct” those restraints that
exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. In
Hopkins v. United States,275 for instance, the government challenged
certain bylaws of a Kansas City livestock exchange.276 Members of the
livestock exchange accepted cattle on consignment from farmers in
various states, resold such livestock to local purchasers, and remitted
net proceeds to the original owners.277 One bylaw fixed members’
commissions and prohibited dealings with non-members.278 Another set
the salary of agents that solicited these consignments and prohibited
members from transmitting market prices to potential consignors.279
The Court unanimously rejected the challenge, again invoking the
direct/indirect distinction.280 Charges for the interstate transportation
of cattle would directly burden interstate commerce.281 However,
charges for selling such cattle on the exchange were not “directly
connected with” or “part of” such commerce.282 The Court acknowledged
that agreements setting local commissions might increase “the cost of
conducting an interstate commercial business.”283 Invocation of the
statute based on such “indirect and incidental” impacts would,
however, “enlarge application of the act far beyond the fair meaning
of the language used.”284 Instead, “[t]here must be some direct and
immediate effect upon interstate commerce in order to come within

275. 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
276. Id. at 579.
277. Id. at 582.
278. Id. at 581.
279. Id. at 581–82.
280. Id. at 597 (invoking United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895),
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114
U.S. 196 (1885), County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691 (1880), and Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875), as exemplifying relevant Commerce Clause principles);
see also id. (“But in all the cases which have come to this court there is not one which
has denied the distinction between a regulation which directly affects and embarrasses
interstate trade or commerce, and one which is nothing more than a charge for a local
facility provided for the transaction of such commerce.”).
281. Id. at 590–91.
282. Id. (distinguishing defendants’ commissions from “charges which are directly
laid upon the article in the course of transportation, and which are charges upon the
commerce itself”).
283. Id. at 592.
284. Id. at 587, 592.
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the act.”285 The Court analogized private agreements potentially governed
by the Sherman Act to state legislation affecting commerce: “An
agreement may in a variety of ways affect interstate commerce, just as state
legislation may, and yet, like it, be entirely valid, because the interference
produced by the agreement or by the legislation is not direct.”286
To illustrate the difference between direct and indirect impacts, the
Court cited E.C Knight, along with decisions evaluating state-imposed
fees on local facilities for compliance with the Commerce Clause.287
While the challenged agreement certainly “enhance[d] the expense to
those engaged in the business,” this effect on interstate commerce
was—like the effect of fees on local facilities—“indirect,” and thus the
contract was “not illegal as a restraint thereon.”288 Only “exorbitant
[local] charges,” the Court said, would sufficiently affect commerce
and justify application of the Act.289 Indeed, subsequent decisions read
Hopkins as holding that the agreement would have violated the Act as
a direct restraint if it had produced unreasonable charges.290
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n291 reflected the same approach.
Defendant railroad companies collusively set rates for interstate traffic
and claimed that, if reasonable, such rates did not offend the Act.292
285. Id. at 592.
286. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
287. Id. (citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590 (1895); Transp.
Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882); and Ficklen v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 145 U.S.
1 (1892)), see also id. at 592 (citing Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S.
288 (1887); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); and Ky.
& Ind. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 37 F. 567 (C.C.D. Ky. 1889)).
288. See id. at 596.
289. Id. at 595–96 (“It is possible that exorbitant charges for the use of these
facilities might have similar effect as . . . a charge upon commerce itself might have. In
a case like that the remedy would probably be forthcoming.”); id. at 594 (citing N.Y.,
Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431 (1895) (rejecting Commerce Clause
challenge to tax upon tolls charged for use of Pennsylvania tracks)) (“As their effect is
either indirect or else they relate to charges for the use of facilities furnished, the
agreements instanced would be valid provided the charges agreed upon were
reasonable. The effect upon the commerce spoken of must be direct and proximate.”).
290. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 525 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905) (concluding that Hopkins “left open” validity of
restraints producing “exorbitant charges”); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE
NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 145–46 (1998)
(concluding that local state or private measures imposing supracompetitive prices on
interstate commerce were deemed “direct” restraints during this period).
291. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
292. Id. at 562 (describing the agreement).
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They also raised a more fundamental challenge, contending that the
Act, as construed in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,293
banned “ordinary contracts and combinations,” that were “at the same
time most indispensable,” because all such arrangements “have the
effect of somewhat restraining trade and commerce, although to a very
slight extent.”294
The Court rejected the defendants’ fundamental challenge.295 While
many beneficial agreements “restrain[ed] trade in some remote and
indirect degree,” any assumption that the Act reached such restraints
was “most violent.”296 The Court invoked Hopkins’s holding that the
statute must have a “reasonable construction,” lest any agreements be
said to have “indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate
commerce, and possibly to restrain it.”297 Like Hopkins, the Court found
this “reasonable construction” in Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
holding that “the statute applies only to those contracts whose direct
and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce,” and not
those affecting such commerce “indirectly or remotely.”298 The
restraint actually before the Court did “directly affect[]” and “of course
[was] intended to affect” interstate railroad rates by “destroying
competition and by maintaining rates above what competition might
produce.”299 Congress had authority to ban agreements producing
such “rates and charges higher than they might otherwise be under the
laws of competition.”300
The Court reiterated these principles in Anderson v. United States,301
another case involving bylaws of a livestock exchange.302 One bylaw
prevented members from “recogniz[ing]” any trader not a member of

293. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
294. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 566–67 (summarizing the defendants’
contentions).
295. Id. at 569.
296. Id. at 568.
297. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898)).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 569.
300. Id. at 571. Three Justices dissented without opinion, apparently reiterating
their dissent in Trans-Missouri Freight, which did not question the direct/indirect
distinction. Id. at 578 (stating that Justices Gray, Shiras, and White dissented); see
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897) (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Field, J., Shiras, J., and Gray, J.).
301. 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
302. Id.

2020] ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 129
the exchange.303 Another required all members of partnerships trading
on the exchange to become members.304 The government contended
that the bylaws excluded non-members from trading cattle transported
across state lines, thus restraining interstate commerce.305
Invoking Hopkins, the Court unanimously disagreed, again drawing
an analogy between public and private restraints affecting interstate
commerce.306 State legislation sometimes “affect[ed] foreign or interstate
commerce without being intended to operate as commercial regulations.”307
The “same is true,” the Court said, with “certain kinds of agreements entered
into between persons engaged in the same business.”308 Agreements for the
“bona fide purpose of properly and reasonably regulating the conduct of
their business among themselves . . . . would be good,” even if they “indirectly
and unintentionally[] affect[ed] interstate trade or commerce.”309
Otherwise, the Court said, there would scarcely be any agreement that had
“interstate or foreign commerce for its subject that may not remotely be said
to, in some obscure way, affect that commerce and to be therefore void.”310
The challenged agreements impacted interstate commerce only
indirectly.311 The Association and restraints “ensure[d] a quick and
certain market for the sale or purchase of the article dealt in” and
“provide[d] a standard of business integrity among the members by
adopting rules for just and fair dealing.”312 The agreements at issue in
Anderson “differ[ed] radically” from agreements condemned under
the Act,313 as the latter agreements “provided for fixing the prices of
the articles dealt in.”314 The Anderson provisions “d[id] not meddle with
prices,” and significant rivalry prevented competitive harm.315 While
expulsions to enforce the Association’s rules excluded some rivals from

303. Id. at 611.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 612.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 616 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 617 (citing United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal & Coke Co., 46 F. 432
(C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891); United States v. Coal Dealers’ Ass’n of Cal., 85 F. 252 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1898); and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)).
314. Id.
315. Id. (describing rivals of the Association as “mak[ing] a large competition
wholly outside of the defendants”).
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the market, there was no intent to affect interstate commerce “in the
slightest degree,” and such expulsions affected interstate commerce
“only most remotely and indirectly.”316 Invoking decisions sustaining
state statutes against Commerce Clause challenges, the Court observed
that the challenged agreement, like those statutes, placed no tax,
condition, or license on “any instrument or subject of commerce.”317
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States318 was the decade’s last word on
the subject, and the Court again drew upon its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence when interpreting the Act.319 The government challenged
a cartel of six pipe manufacturers located in four states.320 The
defendants set prices above cost (including capital costs) and sold
some output across state lines, while other sales were intrastate.321 The
defendants claimed that the commerce power did not reach private
restraints but merely empowered Congress to preempt state-imposed
restraints of interstate commerce.322 They also claimed that banning
such agreements would infringe liberty of contract and that reasonable
prices did not directly restrain interstate commerce.323
Invoking Gibbons (and E.C. Knight), the Court opined that the clause
empowered Congress “to prescribe the rules by which [interstate
commerce] shall be governed.”324 Conceding that concern over stateimposed restraints motivated adoption of the clause, the Court echoed
Anderson and Hopkins, analogizing private agreements to legislation
and using “restrain” and “regulate” interchangeably.325 Some contracts could
“in truth” have the same “effect” on interstate commerce as preempted state
enactments, i.e., could “directly obstruct[] and thus regulate[]” interstate
commerce.326 There was no reason that the commerce power would reach

316. Id. at 618.
317. Id. (citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.
S. 465, 473 (1888); and Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590, 598 (1895)).
318. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
319. Id. at 227.
320. Id. at 212.
321. Id. at 213–25, 247–48.
322. Id. at 226–27.
323. Id. at 227–28.
324. Id. at 228, 241–42; see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12
(1895); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
325. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30, 243–44.
326. Id. at 229–30 (“[P]rivate contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect
upon interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single State of the same
character.”); id. at 230 (“[A]nything which directly obstructs and thus regulates
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only state enactments, while leaving private agreements that “directly
and substantially, and not as a mere incident, regulate interstate
commerce” to state authority.327
The Court employed similar logic when rejecting defendants’ liberty
of contract argument, holding there was no liberty to enter contracts
that directly restrained and thus regulated interstate commerce.328
Instead of delegating regulatory authority to private parties, the
Constitution granted such power to Congress.329 Such agreements
found no shelter in liberty of contract because “the direct results of
such contracts might be the regulation of commerce among the States,
possibly quite as effectually as if a State had passed a statute of like
tenor as the contract.”330
Once again, the Court drew upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
fix the boundaries between state and federal authority over private
agreements. The Court equated private agreements that “restrained
commerce among the states” with legislation that “directly” obstructed and
thus “regulated” interstate commerce, therefore contravening Congress’s
presumed intent to preempt such legislation. The Sherman Act thereby
performed the same role vis-á-vis private restraints—banning those that
“directly restrained and regulated” interstate commerce—as the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its logic of quasi-statutory
preemption performed with respect to state-imposed restraints.331 By the
[interstate commerce], whether it is state legislation or private contracts . . . should be
subject to the power of Congress . . . .”).
327. Id. at 229–30 (“If certain kinds of private contracts do directly . . . limit or
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of
Congress reach those contracts just the same as if the legislation of some State had
enacted the provisions contained in them?”).
328. Id. at 230 (stating that such “liberty of contract” would amount to freedom
from regulation “of a subject which from its general and great importance has been
granted to Congress as the proper representative of the nation at large”); see also Alan
J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 60–65 (1999)
(describing Addyston Pipe’s determination that the challenged restraint produced
supracompetitive prices analogous to burdensome state enactments); William H. Page,
Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antirust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1991)
(asserting that both Joint Traffic and Addyston Pipe invoked “analog[ies] to
governmental restrictions . . . to find the agreement[s] illegal”).
329. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 242 (holding that a contract “which directly operates . . . upon the
sale, transportation and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or
restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate commerce to that extent and to the
same extent trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the
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same logic, agreements that merely affected interstate commerce “indirectly”
exceeded the scope of the Act.332
The Court also offered a functional rationale for its definition of
“restraint of . . . commerce among the several States” and for allocating
authority over such agreements to Congress. Echoing the concerns
about state legislation serving “local or partial interests” that animated
its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court suggested that
allocating authority over such agreements to states would produce suboptimal results, as states took different approaches to such agreements
depending upon each state’s “particular interest.”333 Presumably such
self-interest would manifest itself as lax regulation, perhaps even
enforcement, of cartel agreements fixing prices for goods exported to
other states. The result would be a regulatory policy that enriched a
state’s own firms at the expense of out-of-state consumers, contradicting
the anti-favoritism rationale of the Commerce Clause.
The Court also observed that no state had attempted to regulate such
agreements.334 This omission indicated that states (properly) believed
congressional authority over such agreements was exclusive.335 Like
rates for interstate transportation, where Congress had an “enlarged
view of the interests of all the States,”336 the category of direct restraints
of interstate commerce was inherently national, i.e., “a subject which
from its general and great importance has been granted to Congress
as the proper representative of the nation at large.”337 The Court’s
invocation of these categories confirmed its belief that authority over

statute”); id. at 226–27 (assuming “that the contract in question herein does directly and
substantially operate as a restraint upon and as a regulation of interstate commerce,”
thereby violating the Act).
332. Id. at 228–31 (asserting that the commerce power includes authority to
prohibit “private contracts which directly and substantially, and not merely indirectly,
remotely, incidentally and collaterally, regulate to a greater or less degree commerce
among the States”).
333. See id. at 231; cf. supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
334. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 232.
335. Id. (“[I]t was [probably] supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures
had no jurisdiction.”); Meese, supra note 247, at 2176–78 (explaining Addyston Pipe’s
holding that Congress has exclusive authority over such agreements); see also Hadley
Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906) (citing
Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–33) (holding that states lacked authority over private
agreements restraining interstate commerce).
336. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
337. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230. The Court did not cite Wabash despite invocation
of analogous reasoning. See id.
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such restraints was mutually exclusive and that Congress lacked power
over conduct impacting interstate commerce indirectly.338
Having rejected defendants’ constitutional argument by assuming
arguendo that the cartel “directly” restrained interstate commerce, the
Court proceeded to examine whether the agreement produced such
an effect.339 Consistent with Hopkins, Anderson, and Joint Traffic Ass’n, the
Court focused on whether the restraints produced supracompetitive
prices for interstate transactions.340 The Court rejected defendants’
claim that the cartel set reasonable prices, quoting verbatim three pages
of findings that then-Circuit Judge William Howard Taft had assembled
in his opinion for the Sixth Circuit.341 According to Judge Taft,
defendants’ prices were unreasonable because they well-exceeded costs,
including a reasonable return.342 Moreover, the agreements had the
“immediate” effect of destroying competition so defendants could “obtain
increased prices for themselves.”343 In sum, the agreement restrained
commerce directly because it set supracompetitive prices for interstate
transactions, imposing economic harm on out-of-state purchasers.
This rationale also suggested limits on the reach of the Act—limits
the Court also enforced. The Court reversed that portion of the Sixth
Circuit’s order banning agreements between the defendants setting
the price of intrastate transactions.344 The Court nowhere suggested
that the Act would reach such restraints simply because they impacted
interstate input purchases, for instance. Indeed, E.C. Knight, which the
338. But see supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing contrary position
taken by some scholars and modern Court).
339. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 226–27 (characterizing defendants’ arguments as
assuming that challenged agreements “directly and substantially operate as a restraint
upon and as a regulation of interstate commerce”).
340. Id. at 240–41; cf. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 617 (1898) (holding
that challenged restraint did not directly affect interstate commerce where there was
no evidence of price “meddl[ing]”); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 595–96
(1898) (finding restraint indirect absent exorbitant charges); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569–70 (1898) (finding restraint “direct” because it produced
supracompetitive prices).
341. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235–38 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291–94 (6th Cir. 1898)).
342. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291–94); id. at 238 (“[T]he
combination . . . enhance[d] prices beyond a sum which was reasonable . . . .”).
343. Id. at 244.
344. Id. at 247 (“Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the
States is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is
wholly within a State, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as
they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce.”).
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Court reaffirmed, precluded such a result. After all, the defendants
there bought inputs from outside Pennsylvania and resold most output
in other states.345 But the Court held that a mere effect upon interstate
commerce did not establish a “restraint” of such commerce.346
In five unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in four years, the
Court repeatedly analogized private agreements potentially governed
by the Sherman Act to state enactments potentially preempted by the
quasi-statutory regime implementing the implied will of Congress
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. This analogy naturally led the
Court to read the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects
from this regime into the Act. Just as Congress implicitly preempted
state legislation that directly affected and thus regulated interstate
commerce, so too did the Sherman Act interdict private restraints that
produced such an effect. Conversely, the Act did not reach intrastate
restraints affecting interstate commerce indirectly. This reading of the
Act replicated that suggested by the prior construction canon.347 Taken
together, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the
Sherman Act created a unified regime protecting free competition in
interstate commerce from public and private threats.
These decisions also articulated a consistent methodology for
determining whether an impact on interstate commerce was “direct.”
The Court repeatedly inquired whether the challenged agreements
produced supracompetitive prices for interstate transactions or
transportation and thus imposed economic harm upon out-of-state
citizens.348 Application of this standard turned on facts regarding the
challenged restraint, including the nature of the industry and defendants’
market position.349 Restraints that produced no such effects remained

345. See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text.
346. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12, 15–16 (1895); see also Kidd
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23 (1888) (holding that state police power regulations are
constitutional so long as they do not directly affect interstate commerce).
347. See supra notes 215–23 and accompanying text (describing the prior
construction canon and its application in specific cases).
348. See supra note 340 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note
58, at 446–49 (describing a similar “geographic market power test” for discerning
whether the Act reaches local restraints).
349. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that then-contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence required a fact-intensive analysis of the challenged
state legislation).
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within the exclusive authority of individual states.350 Just as Standard Oil
had drawn on various sources to determine the content of the Rule of
Reason, so too did the Court draw upon Commerce Clause principles
to define the term “direct.”351
Such repeated holdings deserved respect as a matter of stare
decisis—respect that Mandeville Island Farms did not accord them.
These holdings also constitute an important indication of the original
meaning of the statute. Together with the prior construction and
avoidance canons, these contemporaneous constructions rebut the
claim that Congress attempted to exercise concurrent power to ban
agreements that produced only indirect impacts on interstate commerce.
Instead, Congress apparently treated authority over trade restraints as
mutually exclusive, using the direct/indirect standard to define the
boundary between state and federal authority. Moreover, a restraint
was only “direct” if it produced interstate competitive harm.
B. Did Congress Mean the Act to Expand in Response to Novel Commerce
Clause Standards?
The modern Court has not acknowledged the Commerce Clause
origins of the term “restraint of . . . commerce among the several States”
and thus has not grappled with Congress’s apparent invocation of pre1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence to define the reach of the Act.
Proponents of the “substantial effects” test may nonetheless emphasize
that Congress’s choice of the constitutional phrase “restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States” strengthens the claim that Congress
meant to exercise the full extent of its commerce power when addressing
harmful agreements. Even if the 1890 Congress did not intend to displace
then-current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, proponents might argue,
it is still entirely proper to read Wickard’s substantial effects test into
the Act, thereby effectuating Congress’s desire to exercise its entire
commerce power over trade restraints. As explained earlier, the
Supreme Court has invoked this reasoning.352

350. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58,
at 408 (“[A]ccording to competitive federalism, trade restraints that do not plausibly
increase prices to consumers outside the home state should lie beyond federal reach.”).
351. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); see also supra
note 128 and accompanying text (describing how Standard Oil drew upon various
sources to determine content of the Rule of Reason).
352. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. One scholar asserts that
“Congress has never volunteered that the [commerce] power should be viewed more
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Few would deny that the practical reach of the Act properly expands
(or contracts) if changed circumstances result in revised application of
an unchanged direct/indirect standard.353 However, the substantial
effects test is an entirely new standard unknown to the enacting
Congress, a standard that reflects different normative choices about
the proper allocation of authority between states and the national
government. Did the 1890 Congress wish to exercise the maximum
extent of its commerce power under whatever standard the Supreme
Court might later adopt? The text of the Sherman Act neither alludes
to such an intention nor precludes this approach. Moreover, the
empirical record does not compel the conclusion that Congress would
reflexively exercise whatever authority the Court might subsequently
provide. After all, the 1890 Congress and its predecessors rarely
exercised the commerce power, even over subjects with respect to
which Congress’s authority was unquestioned.354
Even modern Congresses sometimes decline to exercise the full
extent of the commerce power. For instance, Congress certainly
possesses authority to preempt state corporate law governing enterprises
operating in interstate commerce and require all such firms to
incorporate under a federal statute.355 However, Congress has declined
to nationalize corporate law, leaving individual states—particularly
Delaware—to generate rules structuring the internal governance of the
nation’s largest commercial enterprises.356 Moreover, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act357 required many employers to
provide employees health insurance but exempted all firms with fewer

narrowly [than the maximum] or the Act read more narrowly than its potential.” See
Gavil, supra note 122, at 695. As shown herein, this statement does not survive scrutiny.
353. See infra notes 407–17 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s
subsequent revision of E.C. Knight’s application of the direct/indirect standard).
354. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“During this period
there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce
power . . . .”).
355. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008)
(describing proposals to subject corporations operating in interstate commerce to
national corporation law).
356. Id. at 25 (describing congressional consideration of proposals in the 1970s to
nationalize corporate law).
357. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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than fifty full-time employees.358 However, Congress plainly has the
authority to require smaller firms to carry such insurance.359
Antitrust itself provides three instances in which Congress has
declined to exercise the full extent of the commerce power as defined
by the Supreme Court. In 1944, the Court ruled that insurance
constitutes “commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause
and the Sherman Act, applying the Act to an interstate insurance
cartel.360 Congress responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,361
exempting the “business of insurance” from federal antitrust law, with
some exceptions.362 The exemption still survives, despite bipartisan
opposition from antitrust agencies and scholars.363 Moreover, when
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act364 in 1936, it declined to
exercise its entire commerce power, banning only offending conduct
occurring “in” interstate commerce and not intrastate conduct that
“directly affects” such commerce.365 Finally, Congress also declined to
exercise its full commerce power when it re-enacted section 7 of the
Clayton Act,366 the federal anti-merger statute, in 1950.367 This statute
applies only to mergers between firms “engaged in commerce,” and

358. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018).
359. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–57 (1971) (holding that the
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate local extortion); Daniel v. Paul, 395
U.S. 298, 305 (1969) (finding that the commerce power reached a snack bar selling
“four food items,” including hamburgers and soft drinks, because some ingredients in
three items originated in other states); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 304
(1964) (determining that the Commerce Clause authorized a ban on discrimination
by restaurant with thirty-six employees because firm’s local supplier purchased out-ofstate meat).
360. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553, 562 (1944).
361. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018).
362. Id. § 1011; see Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance
Sector: Reassessing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915, 936 (2011) (describing
origins and operation of the Act).
363. See Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and
a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 264–65 (2013) (describing
enforcement agency opposition); id. at 330–32 (advocating exemption’s repeal).
364. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
365. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 193–95 (1974) (concluding
that the Robinson-Patman Act only reaches conduct “in” interstate commerce and not
intrastate conduct “affecting” such commerce); Local 167, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 291 U.S. 293, 297 (1934) (applying the Sherman Act to intrastate
conduct that “directly . . . restrain[ed]” interstate movement of poultry).
366. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
367. See id.
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not to those between firms subject to the commerce power because they
“affect” interstate commerce.368
The prospect of post-Wickard expansion of the Sherman Act also
raised novel questions beyond contemplation of the 1890 Congress.
For instance, the Court coupled expansion of the commerce power
with a relaxation of the pre-Wickard assumption that authority over
most commercial activity was mutually exclusive, with the result that
states and the national government now possess concurrent authority
over most trade restraints.369 Expansion of the Act thus required the
Court to determine whether the statute preempted state antitrust
regulation that purported to ban practices deemed reasonable under
federal standards.370 This expansion and recognition of concurrent
authority also facilitated application of the Act to various stateapproved restraints, thereby requiring the Court to decide whether
and how federal courts would supervise local regulation under the
aegis of the Sherman Act.371 Finally, decisions such as Wickard
expanded the commerce power along two dimensions: the substantial
effects test and the aggregation test, creating the prospect of analogous
expansions of the Act.372
Any decision to adjust the scope of the Act in light of the expanded
reach of the commerce power would require—and did require—
judicial resolution of these and other issues, with no guidance from the
statutory text or any other source of statutory meaning. The result was
judicial policymaking unmoored to any intelligible legal standard. For
instance, while the Court embraced Wickard’s substantial effects test
under the Sherman Act, it has simultaneously declined to employ the
aggregation test.373 Moreover, while the Court held that the Act usually
368. Id.; see United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975)
(“[T]he phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ as used in § 7 of the Clayton Act means
engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all
corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power.”); id. at
279–80 (explaining that Congress reenacted this statute in 1950 knowing it did not
reach activities “affecting commerce”).
369. See infra notes 398–401 and accompanying text.
370. See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Section II.A (describing both aspects of Wickard).
373. Instead, the Court has examined whether the restraint itself produces the
requisite effect on interstate commerce. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans,
Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (invoking Wickard only for substantial effects test); Hosp.
Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) (invoking Mandeville Island
Farms only for substantial effects test); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) (per
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does not preempt state antitrust regulation of private restraints, it
simultaneously held that the Act preempts some (but not all) restraints
authorized by states themselves.374 In each case, the Court has engaged
in judicial lawmaking, announcing rules to govern questions that
Congress did not anticipate or address in 1890. It is by no means
certain that the 1890 Congress would have delegated legislative
authority over such questions to unelected judges, even assuming such
a capacious delegation was constitutional.375
In short, it is conceivable that Congress meant the Sherman Act to
incorporate any commerce power standard the Supreme Court might
subsequently announce, including a standard unknown in 1890.
However, it seems at least equally possible that Congress would have
declined to delegate such authority to future Courts. One thing is certain:
the statute contains no affirmative indication regarding Congress’s view
of the question.
Fortunately, there is a canon of construction well-suited for resolving
this ambiguity—namely, the federal-state balance canon.376 The Court
first employed this canon during the 1940s to temper vast expansions
of the commerce power in various contexts, including the Federal
Trade Commission Act377 and even the Sherman Act.378 The canon

curiam) (same); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12
(1974) (distinguishing case-by-case Sherman Act inquiry from instances where
“Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce”).
374. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101–02 (1989) (holding that the
Sherman Act generally does not preempt more intrusive state antitrust remedies for
conduct condemned by state and federal law). Compare FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S.
621, 634, 638 (1992) (invalidating state-authorized price fixing because state did not
adequately supervise private actors that state law authorized to determine prices), with
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943) (holding that the Sherman Act did not
invalidate state-imposed limit on raisin output).
375. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406–09 (1928)
(invalidating delegation of authority to the executive branch because Congress did not
articulate an “intelligible principle” governing that delegation).
376. See Barrett, supra note 208, at 123–24 (describing different canons of statutory
interpretation and noting that some, including federalism canons, serve “constitutional
values”).
377. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018).
378. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) (declining to apply the Sherman Act
to a union conspiracy that closed a factory shipping goods in interstate commerce
because maintaining “a proper distribution between state and national governments
of police authority and of remedies for private and public . . . wrongs is of far-reaching
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requires courts to avoid reading federal statutes to invade “domain[s]
traditionally left to the States,” unless the statute clearly requires such
a significant expansion of federal power.379
Despite referencing the balance of authority between sovereigns, this
canon only applies when ascertaining the reach of statutes regulating
private parties, independent of any question of preemption.380 The
Court has invoked this canon in cases involving the regulation of
firearms,381 possession of gambling devices,382 arson of a dwelling,383
local unfair competition,384 and violent strikes shuttering factories
producing goods for interstate sale.385 In each case, the Court refused to
apply a federal statute to private conduct traditionally subject only to
state regulation, even though the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents
empowered Congress to regulate such activity.386 Describing operation
of this canon in the context of commercial regulation, Justice Frankfurter
explained that expansive application of federal statutes in novel
circumstances would be “retrospective” and “properly deserve[] the
stigma of judicial legislation.”387
importance [and] [a]n intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to
Congress”).
379. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance.”); see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting Bass, 404
U.S. at 350) (same); Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 450 (“[W]e must assume that the
implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a major premise of all
congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein.”); FTC v. Bunte
Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941) (declining to treat local commercial practices as “in
commerce” because “[a]n inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such
far-reaching import . . . ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress”); Apex
Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 513.
380. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947) (articulating
canon against preemption over subjects traditionally subject to state regulation).
381. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 344–45, 349.
382. See Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 449–51.
383. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 852, 858.
384. See Bunte Bros, 312 U.S. at 351–52; Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540
(contending that federal courts must read federal statutes in light of the nation’s dual
system of government).
385. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940).
386. See, e.g., Jones, 529 U.S. at 858–59 (declining to apply statute to arson of dwelling
consuming out-of-state natural gas because doing so would alter federal-state balance
and “arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime”).
387. See Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540 (“[W]hen the Federal Government takes
over such local radiations in the vast network of our national economic enterprise and
thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, [Congress is]
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Development of this canon paralleled development of a related
canon, namely, the presumption against preemption of state law.388
Both canons buttress states’ regulatory prerogatives over conduct the
primary effects of which occur within states’ borders, thereby preserving
regulatory diversity in a federal system.389 States may exercise these
prerogatives in various ways. They may ban such conduct (imposing
the same, more lenient, or harsher penalties as provided by federal
law), allow such conduct, or even encourage it.390
Intrastate restraints that impact interstate commerce indirectly are
certainly a “domain traditionally left to the States.”391 As explained
earlier, states have been regulating intrastate restraints, including
those producing substantial fortuitous effects on interstate commerce,
since before 1890, employing corporate, antitrust, and contract law.392
The Supreme Court bolstered such regulation by repeatedly declining,
over five decades, to apply the Sherman Act to such conduct, granting
states exclusive authority.393 States exercised such authority with gusto,
bringing numerous cases under their own antitrust laws.394 States also
declined to ban certain intrastate restraints that would have violated the
Sherman Act if deemed restraints of interstate commerce.395 The Supreme
reasonably explicit and do[es] not entrust its attainment to that retrospective expansion
of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.”).
388. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234–37 (1947); Ernest A. Young,
Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS,
NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 264–66 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007)
(explaining how Rice presumption protects traditional state prerogatives).
389. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1681, 1707–08 (2008) (explaining how presumption against preemption reflects
the Constitution’s background assumption that state law governs most disputes).
390. Cf. Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that congressional
imposition of prison sentence more than triple that of analogous state law illustrated
how federal legislation “may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that states “perform[ing] their role[s] as laboratories for experimentation” reveals
“the theory and utility of our federalism”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 n.15
(1971) (observing that some states allowed firearm possession); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
391. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 339.
392. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (discussing state antitrust
enforcement in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
395. For example, during the 1930s, several states adopted “fair trade” laws
exempting minimum resale price maintenance from their own antitrust laws whenever
the manufacturer’s products faced significant inter-brand competition. See Dr. Miles
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Court and other courts repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to
regulation of local restraints that also incidentally impacted interstate
commerce, further legitimizing such regulation.396 Indeed, in 1989, the
Court recognized the “long history of state common-law and statutory
remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices” and concluded
that state antitrust law is “an area traditionally regulated by the States.”397
By abruptly expanding the Act to reach intrastate restraints with
fortuitous effects on interstate commerce, the Court significantly
altered the allocation of regulatory responsibility between states and
the nation, granting the latter authority over restraints producing only
intrastate harm. To be sure, the Court simultaneously jettisoned
precedents holding that jurisdiction over commercial activity was

Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 373, 400 (1911) (condemning
interstate resale price maintenance under section 1 of the Act); Ewald T. Grether,
Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 640, 640 & n.2 (1936) (reporting that, as of 1935, California and nine other states,
representing forty percent of the nation’s population, had adopted such legislation).
Congress, of course, empowered states to adopt “fair trade” legislation with respect to
minimum resale price maintenance governing interstate sales between 1937 and 1975,
thereby exempting such agreements from the Sherman Act. See Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904–05 (2007) (recounting this
history). Some states also recognized a reasonable price defense to horizontal price
fixing, a defense not available under the Sherman Act. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445, 453 (1927) (invalidating Colorado statute recognizing such a defense as
unduly vague).
396. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 420–22 (1910)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to state antitrust statute); Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 108–09, 111 (1909) (rejecting due process challenge to state
antitrust law); Nat’l Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 127–33 (1905) (rejecting
due process and equal protection challenge to state antitrust statute); Smiley v. Kansas,
196 U.S. 447, 454–55, 457 (1905) (rejecting due process challenge to state antitrust
statute); Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 65 So. 468, 470–71 (Miss.
1914) (condemning local price discrimination under state antitrust law even though
product was manufactured out-of-state); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 78 N.E. 136, 136,
138–39 (Mass. 1906) (invalidating local tying agreement under state antitrust law even
though tied product was manufactured out-of-state); id. at 139 (“This statute does not
attempt directly to regulate interstate commerce . . . . Indirectly it affects it . . . where
contracts are made for the sale and transportation of property in another state to a
purchaser in this state.”); see also In re Op. of the Justices, 99 N.E. 294, 294 (Mass. 1912)
(explaining that proposed Massachusetts antitrust statute reached only intrastate
restraints and thus did not purport to regulate interstate commerce despite indirect
impact on such commerce).
397. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
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mutually exclusive.398 Thus, states remained free to regulate agreements
now subject to the Sherman Act.399 However, as noted earlier, state
regulation could only replicate or exceed the scope of regulation
imposed via the Sherman Act, which now provided a regulatory floor.400
The result was a (much) smaller sphere of exclusive state authority and
less regulatory diversity.401
This major shift occurred without any amendment of the Sherman
Act and no other “clear expression” of congressional purpose.402 Thus,
in the words of Justice Frankfurter, the shift “radically readjust[ed] the
balance of state and national authority” and constituted “retrospective
expansion of meaning” and “judicial legislation.”403 Indeed, Mandeville
Island Farms, the origin of the shift, did not mention the federal-state

398. See Meese, supra note 247, at 2185–86 (explaining how the post-New Deal Court
validated overlapping state and federal authority over trade restraints).
399. Id. at 2164–66; Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 536–39 (1997) (explaining how the postNew Deal Court altered Commerce Clause jurisprudence to avoid invalidating state
laws directly burdening interstate commerce); see also ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100–
01 (rejecting claim that Sherman Act preempted state antitrust statute permitting
indirect purchasers to recover treble damages despite the fact that such recovery is not
available under the Sherman Act); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130–
34 (1978) (rejecting Commerce Clause and Sherman Act challenges to state ban on
procompetitive vertical integration and price discrimination).
400. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. For instance, state fair trade laws
that purported to exempt most local minimum resale price maintenance from state
regulation became irrelevant because the Sherman Act now reached nearly all such
agreements. While Congress empowered states to exempt such agreements from the
Act in 1937, Congress repealed this authorization in 1975, subjecting minimum resale
price maintenance to a uniform national ban, until 2007, when the Court declared
such agreements subject to fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at
885–87, 904–05 (overruling Dr. Miles and holding that courts should evaluate
minimum resale price maintenance under a fact-intensive rule of reason analysis).
401. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (identifying various state
enforcement regimes prior to the Court’s expansion of the scope of the Sherman Act);
cf. Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 451–59 (describing benefits of competitive
federalism in production of antitrust doctrine).
402. See infra Part VI and accompanying text (finding no indication in legislative
history that Congress meant to alter the balance between state and federal authority
over trade restraints); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (articulating
the requirement that Congress clearly express its purpose to “significantly change[]
the federal-state balance”).
403. Frankfurter, supra note 219, at 540.
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balance canon, which the Court had applied twice earlier in the same
decade in antitrust cases.404
C. Do Changed Economic Circumstances Justify the Substantial Effects Test?
Resolution of the first two arguments for adopting the substantial
effects test paves the way for evaluation of the third: namely, that the
test is a faithful translation of the underlying principle governing the
scope of the Act. Any effort to translate a legal text in light of changed
circumstances must begin by identifying the principle animating the
relevant text and reflecting the lawgiver’s normative choices. Unfortunately,
no proponent of the substantial effects test has identified the underlying
principle that, when properly translated, mandates adoption of this test.
Thus, scholars evaluating the changed circumstances argument must
attempt to identify such a principle. As explained, the best evidence of
statutory meaning establishes that by adopting the term “in restraint
of . . . commerce among the several States,” Congress invoked a term
of art referring to state statutes that “regulate interstate commerce . . .
in a constitutional sense.”405 Thus, Congress meant to reach those
private agreements that imposed a similar effect on interstate commerce
and injured consumers in more than one state, because states would
likely exercise any regulatory authority over such contracts in a selfinterested or “partial” manner that favored their own citizens over
others.406
Like its progenitor in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Sherman Act’s direct/indirect standard was fact-intensive and flexible,
allowing for evolving applications—translations—in light of exogenous
changes in context.407 This flexibility allowed the Court to adjust the
reach of the Act to effectuate Congress’s apparent intent to exercise
exclusive authority over intrastate agreements that produced interstate
harm and thus would otherwise be subject to suboptimal rules
generated by states with distorted incentives.

404. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350, 355 (1941) (limiting the reach of the
Federal Trade Commission Act); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 494–95,
500–01 (1940) (limiting the scope of the Sherman Act).
405. See supra notes 238–44 and accompanying and immediately following text
(canvassing nineteenth century case law equating “restraint” with “regulation” prior to
passage of the Sherman Act).
406. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
407. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 195, at 58–59 (explaining how application of a standard
can vary with changing facts).
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The modification of E.C. Knight exemplifies such a translation of an
unchanged principle in light of new information. Mandeville Island
Farms and Wickard characterized the decision as mechanically holding
that the Act could never reach a merger between manufacturers.408
Subsequently, in Standard Oil, the Court condemned a scheme
including numerous mergers to monopolize the national refined oil
market.409 The Court rejected the defendants’ contention that E.C.
Knight sheltered these mergers from Sherman Act condemnation,
finding that the challenged scheme not only restrained trade, but also
directly affected interstate commerce.410 Moreover, as previously
described, the Court would repeatedly opine that an intrastate
agreement affected interstate commerce “directly” and thus fell within
the Sherman Act if the parties intended to restrain interstate
commerce.411 Plaintiffs could prove intent expressly or courts could
infer it from surrounding circumstances, particularly market structure,
the economic position of the parties to the agreement, and the
location of the restraint’s victims.412
The Court never identified what circumstances justified post-E.C.
Knight applications of the Act to intrastate restraints such as mergers
between manufacturers. However, it is not difficult to imagine an
explanation. Recall that, in Addyston Pipe, the Court had articulated
how states lacked appropriate incentives to regulate cartels that
exercised market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers.413
The Court rejected the view of some that supracompetitive pricing was
impossible absent predatory tactics or state-created entry barriers.414 If

408. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
409. 221 U.S. 1, 73–77 (1911).
410. Id. at 68–69 (recounting the contention that E.C. Knight precluded application
of the Act to defendants’ conduct).
411. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text (summarizing this case law).
412. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v.
Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542–43 (1913) (finding that intrastate restraint cornering New
York cotton exchange raised inference that defendants intended to directly restrain
interstate commerce).
413. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899)
(explaining that states would adopt self-interested policies toward direct restraints of
interstate commerce).
414. See generally Meese, supra note 328, at 30–33 (describing views of then-Judge
Peckham and Thomas Cooley during the 1880s that private restraints could not
maintain supracompetitive prices absent predatory tactics and/or state-created entry
barriers). Peckham later authored Addyston Pipe, which included a finding that a
private cartel produced prices above the competitive level. See id. at 67 (“The facts in
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a private agreement between six firms could produce such interstate
harm, it would seem to follow that a merger to monopoly over a
product sold in interstate commerce could cause the same impact. Just
as states possessed suboptimal incentives vis-á-vis the regulation of
private restraints of interstate commerce itself, so too did they possess
suboptimal incentives with respect to intrastate restraints, including
mergers, that directly burdened interstate commerce by raising
interstate prices.415 Indeed, New Jersey had acted on such incentives in
the late nineteenth century, adjusting its corporate law to facilitate
mergers—including those in E.C. Knight and Standard Oil—that injured
out-of-state consumers by creating market power over interstate
markets.416 Presumably, the Standard Oil Court was aware of these
developments as well as pre-1910 reform efforts by soon-to-be
Governor Woodrow Wilson and others.417 Expansion of the Sherman
Act to reach such restraints, perhaps contrary to the subjective
expectations of the 1890 Congress, was a faithful implementation of
the unchanged principle that animated and determined the scope of
the statute and resulting division of authority between states and the
national government.
The validity of one translation does not suggest that all proposed
translations are legitimate, however. No Supreme Court justice or other
proponent of the “substantial effects” test has identified any changed
circumstances suggesting that all or most agreements that induce
substantial impacts on interstate commerce result in interstate harm
or that states otherwise lack proper incentives to regulate such
agreements. To be sure, the nation’s economy is more integrated than
in 1890, commerce takes many different forms, and economic activity
Addyston Pipe [showed] . . . that purely private cartels could drive prices above the
competitive level without state assistance or private restraints on the behavior of third
parties . . . . Peckham could no longer cling to the result he had advocated so forcefully
[in the 1880s].”).
415. Cf. Patten, 226 U.S. at 541–44 (finding that Act reached intrastate conspiracy
to corner cotton sales on New York Exchange given likely impact upon price of cotton
traded in interstate commerce).
416. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677, 678–79, 681 (1989) (describing New Jersey’s success in the late
nineteenth century at attracting incorporations by empowering such firms to merge
with rivals with impunity); Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 84–86 (documenting how
developments in New Jersey corporate law undermined states’ ability to protect their
citizens from mergers creating market power).
417. See Grandy, supra note 416, at 687–89 (describing contemporary recognition
that New Jersey had created a “legal externality” and resulting reform efforts).
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often takes place in larger enterprises.418 Thus, some restraints that
produced no impact on interstate commerce in 1890 may now do so.419
Still, a mere effect on such commerce does not constitute interstate
harm and thereby justify federal intervention under the anti-favoritism
principle that apparently animated the meaning of “restraint of . . .
commerce among the several States.” The Court that articulated pre1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence and presumably the Congress
that enacted the Sherman Act were well aware that local activity could
impact interstate commerce. Indeed, the whole point of the Commerce
Clause was to empower Congress to prevent states from thwarting
economic integration by enacting self-interested legislation—including
regulation of local subjects—that burdened interstate commerce.420
The nineteenth century Court employed the direct/indirect standard
as applied to state regulation of intrastate activity to distinguish effects
that gave rise to the possibility of self-interested legislation from those
that did not.421
The Court applied the same direct/indirect standard under the
Sherman Act for five decades to distinguish restraints that produced
interstate harm from those that merely produced interstate effects.
Proof that a greater proportion of trade restraints now impacts
interstate commerce likely means there will be more occasions to apply
the direct/indirect standard. Moreover, such applications may identify
more restraints producing direct impacts than during the pre-Wickard
era. Neither result, however, suggests that the direct/indirect standard
and the anti-favoritism principle it implements are somehow
inadequate. There is simply no indication that the substantial effects test
is a superior method of identifying restraints that states are unwilling or
unable to regulate in an optimal manner. Instead of applying the
original principle in light of new facts, then, the substantial effects test
apparently engrafts an entirely new principle onto the Sherman Act
and imputes to Congress the endorsement of a standard that body
never heard of, let alone embraced.
418. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991) (“[A]s the
dimensions and complexity of our economy have grown, the federal power over
commerce, and the concomitant coverage of the Sherman Act, have experienced
similar expansion.”); supra note 118 (collecting additional cases).
419. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“As interstate
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come
to have effects on the national economy . . . .”).
420. See supra Section II.A.
421. See supra Part I.
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VI. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Application of conventional tools of statutory construction establishes
that the Sherman Act reaches only those intrastate restraints that
“directly” affect interstate commerce by producing harm exceeding the
boundaries of a single state. The Supreme Court has looked beyond
such conventional sources of meaning, however, invoking the Act’s
legislative history to support the modern approach.422 Indeed, the
Court’s most recent pronouncement on the scope of the Act vis-á-vis
local restraints summarized the Act’s legislative history as follows: “The
floor debates on the Sherman Act reveal, in Senator Sherman’s words,
an intent to ‘g[o] as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go.’”423
In support of this assertion, the Court cited United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n,424 which had similarly claimed that “all the
acceptable evidence” established that “Congress wanted to go to the
utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and
monopoly agreements.”425 South-Eastern Underwriters had also concluded
that there is “not one piece of reliable evidence that the Congress of
1890 intended to freeze the proscription of the Sherman Act within
the mold of then current judicial decisions defining the commerce
power.”426 This later statement and others rebuked the claim that the
Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence established limits
on the reach of the Act.427 South-Eastern Underwriters had invoked three

422. See, e.g., United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 555–60, 558 n.46
(1944) (reviewing legislative reports and recounting statements by congressional
sponsors of the Sherman Act).
423. See Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 328, n.7 (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1899));
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940)) (“Congress, in passing the Sherman
Act, left no area of its constitutional power unoccupied; it ‘exercised all the power it
possessed.’”); Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493 n.15 (reaching same conclusion after review
of legislative history); see also Gavil, supra note 159, at 692–93 (contending that
Congress intended the Act to expand along with the commerce power); id. at 683–95
(reviewing legislative history, including statements by Senator Sherman, and
concluding that the Senate did not embrace the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause
jurisprudence); id. at 690 n.149.
424. 332 U.S. 533 (1944).
425. Id. at 557–58.
426. Id. at 557.
427. Id. at 556–57 (“[W]e fail to find in the legislative history of the Act an
expression of a clear and unequivocal desire of Congress to legislate only within that
area previously declared by this Court to be within the federal power.”).
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snippets of legislative history to buttress these claims, each a quotation
from a different participant in congressional floor debates:
(1) “The bill has been very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover
every case which comes within what is called the commercial power of
Congress.”428
(2) “I do not wish to single out any particular trust or combination. It
is not a particular trust, but the system I aim at.”429
(3) “The provisions of this trust bill are just as broad, sweeping, and
explicit as the English language can make them to express the power of
Congress over this subject under the Constitution of the United States.”430
Proponents of the substantial effects test would presumably contend
that such history provides the sort of “clear statement” of Congress’s
desire to upset the traditional federal-state balance, for instance. The
current Supreme Court is less receptive to legislative history than it was
during the 1940s and 1950s, however, and may be reluctant to rely
upon such history to override the apparent meaning of the statute.431
As it turns out, there is no such conflict for the Court to resolve. Instead
of supporting the “substantial effects” test, the legislative history appears
to bolster the conclusions reached in Section V.A above, namely, that
Congress likely embraced the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence
and mutual exclusivity of state and federal authority over trade
restraints. Moreover, there appears to be no evidence that Congress
meant the scope of the Act to expand if the Court rejected its pre-1890
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in favor of novel standards governing
the reach of the Commerce Clause.
A. The Senate
While often described as a codification of the common law, the
Sherman Act had its genesis in a controversy about tariff policy. President
Cleveland’s 1887 Annual Message called for substantial tariff reduction.432
He claimed that tariffs often facilitated domestic cartels’ “regulation of
the supply and price of commodities made and sold by members of the
combination.”433
428. Id. at 588 n.46 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George)).
429. Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
430. Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 6314 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart)).
431. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304
(2006) (rejecting contention that legislative history overrode meaning of statute
determined by conventional textual methods).
432. See President Grover Cleveland, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1887).
433. Id.
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Like many Republicans, Senator Sherman434 supported robust
protective tariffs.435 Nonetheless, he expressed support for reducing tariffs
on goods with respect to which domestic “combinations [would] prevent
a reduction of price by fair competition.”436 Six months later, Sherman
introduced a resolution directing the Senate Finance Committee to
investigate measures for controlling contracts, trusts, or other
arrangements that tended to “prevent free and full competition” or
“tend[ed] to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the
consumer of necessary articles of human life.”437
Five weeks later, Sherman introduced legislation to advance these
objectives. The bill purported to regulate agreements impacting
production and articles of “domestic growth.”438 The Committee soon
reported a significantly-altered bill on September 11, 1888.439 Apparently
for constitutional reasons, the bill struck unqualified references to
“production” and “articles of domestic growth.”440 Like the original bill,
this version bore little resemblance to what would become the Sherman
Act. The new version tethered the bill’s coverage to markets involving
foreign or interstate commerce, banning concerted action that limited
free competition in:
(1) “importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into
the United States”;
(2) “production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth
or production, or domestic raw material that competes with any similar
article [subject to an American tariff]”;
(3) “production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth
or production, or domestic raw material . . . which shall be transported
from one State or Territory to another.”441

434. This Article refers to members of the 1890 Congress using their title in the first
instance and omits titles in most subsequent references for brevity.
435. See 19 CONG. REC. 187 (1888) (expressing support for reasonable tariffs in a
reply to President Cleveland’s address).
436. Id. at 190; see HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 167 (1954) (noting that Senator Sherman generally
supported tariffs unless such exactions fostered combinations or monopolies).
437. See 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888).
438. See S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888) (as introduced Aug. 14, 1888).
439. See S. 3445 (as amended Sept. 11, 1888); THORELLI, supra note 436, at 170
(discussing introduction of revised S. 3445).
440. THORELLI, supra note 436, at 170 (suggesting that September 11 version of S.
3445 eliminated certain “obvious [constitutional] defects” of the initial bill).
441. S. 3445 (as amended Sept. 11, 1888).
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By including “articles” competing with those subject to tariffs, the new
language fulfilled Sherman’s desire to prevent tariffs from encouraging
anticompetitive combinations.442 The bill expired without further action.443
Sherman reintroduced the bill in the 51st Congress on December 4,
1889, and the Senate referred the bill to the Finance Committee.444
The Senate took up the bill on January 14, 1890.445 The Senate then
began debate on the bill, now denominated S. 1, which replicated the
September 11, 1888 version verbatim.446 Several Senators raised
constitutional objections to Sherman’s measure.
Most importantly, Senator James George, former Chief Justice of
Mississippi and a member of the Judiciary Committee, argued that
various applications of the bill exceeded Congress’s authority.447 The
Supreme Court has quoted George in support of its broad characterization
of the Act and contention that the scope of the Act expands whenever the
Court expands the scope of the commerce power.448 A review of George’s
speech and his colleagues’ reaction illuminates the Senate’s views regarding
the scope of its commerce power over trade restraints.
George explained in great detail why the bill would exceed Congress’s
authority, invoking the Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence and
categories employed to implement it.449 He correctly noted that the
Court had defined commerce to “embrace purchase, sale, exchange,
barter, transportation, and intercourse for the purpose of trade in all
its forms.”450 “Regulation” was defined to entail “prescribing rules for
carrying on that commerce; that is, regulating the doing of the things
which of themselves constitute that commerce.”451 That power reached
only “the very transactions between men which are commerce, interstate

442. See supra notes 435–37 and accompanying text.
443. See THORELLI, supra note 436, at 173.
444. See id. at 174.
445. See id. at 177.
446. See 21 CONG. REC. 1765 (1890) (reproducing S. 1, the then-current version of
Senator Sherman’s bill reported by the Finance Committee).
447. Id. at 1765–71. Senator George had developed similar themes in the previous
year. See 20 CONG. REC. 1459–62 (1889) (enumerating defects in the proposed bill and
arguing that the bill itself was unconstitutional).
448. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944).
449. See 21 CONG. REC. 1768–72 (1890) (reproducing Senator George’s floor speech,
which argued—by reference to nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence—
that Sherman’s bill was unconstitutional).
450. Id. at 1768 (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); County of
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 702 (1880)).
451. Id.
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or foreign.”452 Transactions before or after interstate commerce, while
“strictly commercial,” “are only domestic commerce in the State in which
they take place, and are beyond the power of Congress to regulate.”453
Thus, authority to regulate commercial activity was mutually exclusive
between states and the national government. Congress had no power over
“manufactures or any other kind of production,” which were not commerce,
“nor sales, nor transportation,” which were commerce, “purely within a
State.”454
George next critiqued the bill’s three jurisdictional categories.455
Focusing on articles which “shall be transported . . . from one State to
another,” he correctly explained that Supreme Court decisions left
production and agriculture within exclusive jurisdiction of individual
states, even if producers intended to export the resulting products and
thus engage in “commerce among the States.”456 While both decisions
George cited entailed Commerce Clause challenges to state laws, he
regarded each as definitive expositions of the affirmative scope of
congressional power, thus treating state and federal authority over
such activity as mutually exclusive.457 To be constitutional, he said,
congressional “regulation must be of the act or the transaction of
[interstate] commerce itself,” and not activity before or after such
commerce.458 Nor did it matter if products competed “with dutiable
goods.”459 If imposing tariffs on foreign manufacturers authorized
Congress to ensure “free competition” between domestic firms, Congress
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 1768–69 (“The methods of these operations of industry and art are
exclusively for the States to regulate.”). Senator George also opined that states
possessed exclusive power to punish “combinations and trusts within their respective
limits.” See 20 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889) (“[T]here is a dividing line plainly marked by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon one side of which rests
the police power of the State, and on the other the commercial power of Congress.”).
455. Recall that the bill reached agreements governing: (1) imported articles, (2)
articles competing with dutiable goods, and (3) those which “shall be transported for
sale from one State or Territory to another.” S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888) (as amended
Sept. 11, 1888); 21 CONG. REC. 1767, 1769–70 (1890).
456. 21 CONG. REC. 1767, 1769 (1890) (discussing Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886),
and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888)); see also id. at 1768–69 (invoking Veazie v.
Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852), and Lord v. S.S. Co., 102 U.S. 541 (1881)).
457. But see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236, 238 (1948) (contending that Congress rejected dual federalism and mutual
exclusivity).
458. 20 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889).
459. 21 CONG. REC. 1769–70 (1890).
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could create authority over any industry by imposing duties on competing
foreign products, exercising “unlimited” power.460
Finally, George turned to concerted action reducing competition
with respect to “transportation, or sale of articles imported into the
United States.”461 The “plain meaning” of the bill banned restraints
governing products imported into a state while no longer in their
original packages and thus indistinguishable from other property in the
state.462 Numerous decisions held that states had exclusive authority over
such goods, and this provision therefore exceeded Congress’s power.463
Less than a month after George’s speech, the Finance Committee
introduced a new bill, with a different basis for the exercise of federal
regulatory power.464 Explaining the bill, Sherman attributed the
change to George’s opposition, as did at least one other Senator.465
The new bill eliminated references to goods on which Congress had
imposed duties and goods that “shall be transported . . . from one State
or Territory to another.”466 Instead, invoking the diversity jurisdiction
conferred by Article III of the Constitution, the bill banned arrangements
between citizens of two or more states that tended to “prevent free and
full competition” or “advance the cost to the consumer” with respect to:
(1) “importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into
the United States”;
(2) “articles of growth, production, or manufacture of any State or
Territory of the United States [competing] with similar articles of the
growth, production, or manufacture of any other State”; or
(3) “transportation or sale” of articles produced, grown or manufactured
in one State, “into or within any other State.”467
Sherman then offered a lengthy defense of the policy and
constitutionality of this new bill. Echoing the dual federalism informing

460. Id.
461. Id. at 1770.
462. Id.
463. Id. (discussing License Cases, 45 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)).
464. See id. at 2455 (reproducing amended bill).
465. Id. at 2567 (stating that Senator Sherman revised the bill “to avoid somewhat the
criticism of the Senator from Mississippi”); id. at 2463 (statement of Sen. Vest) (same).
466. See supra notes 455–60 and accompanying text (describing George’s critique of
this language in previous bill).
467. See 21 CONG. REC. 2455 (1890); see also id. at 2456, 2460 (explaining that Article
III jurisdiction “embraces the whole field of the common law and of commercial law”
except between citizens of the same state, which the bill was not intended to target).
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence,468 Sherman claimed that the new bill
did not purport to govern “combinations within the limit of the State”
but only reached those that “injuriously affect the interests of the United
States.”469 In language sometimes quoted as a definitive exposition of the
statute Congress ultimately enacted,470 Sherman opined as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United States
to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously
affect the interests of the United States that have been applied in the
several States to protect local interests . . . . If the combination is
confined to a State[,] the State should apply the remedy; if it is
interstate . . . Congress must apply the remedy.471

Moreover, Sherman emphasized that the bill only applied where
defendants were citizens of different states. Article III, he said,
empowered Congress to regulate such contracts, just as Congress could
provide rules of decision in diversity cases.472 Sherman also invoked the
taxing and commerce power as providing authority to reach the
conduct banned by the bill.473
Despite Sherman’s rhetorical embrace of dual federalism, the new
bill did not assuage Senator George.474 More importantly, other
Senators now criticized the bill. Senator Vest of Missouri, for instance,
emphasized that Supreme Court precedent granted only limited
powers to Congress and that such limits were one of the Constitution’s
chief virtues.475 He praised Senator George for an “admirable
dissertation upon constitutional power” in explaining why Sherman’s
original bill exceeded those limits.476 This latest bill exceeded those
limits, by means of “an uncertain commingling of two elements utterly
incongruous and utterly inconsistent.”477 Like George, he invoked

468. See supra note 173 and accompanying and immediately preceding text (describing
this jurisprudence).
469. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456, 2460 (1890).
470. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J.
375, 378–79 (1983); Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 58, at 450.
471. 21 CONG. REC. 2456–57 (1890).
472. Id. at 2460.
473. Id. at 2461.
474. Id. at 2560 (describing Senator Sherman’s most recent bill as “utterly without
warrant in the Constitution”).
475. Id. at 2463 (“We live, very fortunately, in my judgment, under a written
Constitution, and we are governed by the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard to
the legislative powers vested in us.”).
476. See id.
477. Id. at 2464.
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“three leading cases” defining the power to regulate interstate commerce
as the power to govern “commerce in articles . . . after they have gone into
commerce and are in transitu from one State to another.”478
Echoing Senators George and Vest, Senator Hiscock from New York
contended that Senators should “resist efforts in the direction of
unwise, illegal, and unconstitutional legislation.”479 Invoking the Court’s
dual federalism jurisprudence, including the mutual exclusivity of
authority over trade restraints, he argued that the bill exceeded
Congress’s power in various ways.480 With respect to imports, he said,
the bill reached acts done both before importation, while the goods
were outside the United States, but also after goods had “passed
beyond the hands of the importer” and were subject (exclusively) to
“State law” and “State taxation.”481 Thus, the bill purported to reach
conduct exceeding Congress’s power “[a]t both ends” and “[did] not
pretend to regulate interstate commerce.”482
Senator Hiscock also warned of the “enormities” and the “far-reaching
effect[s]” if the bill became law and if courts declared it constitutional.483
The result, he said, would be “for Congress to take control of every
producing interest in the respective States of the Union.”484 He
expressed agreement with the Court’s jurisprudence, rejecting the
view that the Constitution was defective because it lacked a provision
empowering Congress to regulate contracts covered by the bill.485 The
478. Id. at 2465. Senator Vest was likely referring to Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888), Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419 (1827). See supra note 456 and accompanying text (describing Senator George’s
discussion of these cases); see also 21 CONG. REC. 2465 (1890) (asserting that
congressional authority disappeared once goods left their original package and “went
into the common mass of the property of the people of the State”); id. (endorsing
Senator George’s argument “that we have no power under any clause of the Federal
Constitution to legislate as to any article simply because it . . . may be at some time
carried to another State”).
479. 21 CONG. REC. 2467 (1890).
480. Id. at 2468 (“[This] is not a jurisdiction that can be possessed by a State and
the General Government at the same time.”).
481. Id. at 2467.
482. Id. (“At both ends it legislates with reference to commerce before the
merchandise has been dispatched on its way to this country, and after it has reached
here and after it has been taken out of the volume of commerce.”).
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 2468 (rejecting the argument “that the framers of the Constitution
neglected to put something in the Constitution that . . . g[ave] Congress the proper
authority in respect to this subject”).
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Framers had adopted the Commerce Clause to empower the “General
Government [to] prevent States from practically prohibiting commerce
between each other, for the purpose of regulating taxation upon
property which was to go from one State to another.”486 There was no
reason, he said, to expand that power.487 Like Senator Vest, Hiscock
rejected Sherman’s invocation of Article III’s diversity jurisdiction as a
font of regulatory authority.488 His “fundamental” objections to the bill,
he said, could “not be obviated by any amendments that possibly [could]
be proposed.”489
Senator Reagan of Texas also raised constitutional objections.
Congress had a “limited power” “[o]n this subject,” and could not solve
the trust problem unless “the several States t[ook] hold of the subject
and ma[de] provisions there which [would have] cover[ed] the larger
number and the greater amount of the wrongs complained of.”490 He
endorsed criticisms leveled by Senators Vest and Hiscock but did not wish
to occupy the Senate’s time repeating them. He opined that “[a] good
deal of [the bill] . . . is not within the provisions of the Constitution.”491
Senator Reagan urged Senators who agreed with this critique to vote
for his own amendment, which took the form of a substitute bill.492 By
its terms, the bill only applied to business “carried on with any foreign
country, or between the States, or between any State and the District
of Columbia.”493 The Senate, acting in the Committee of the Whole,
adopted Reagan’s entire bill, adding the language to S. 1. After this
and other amendments, the bill included sixteen sections, fourteen
more than Sherman’s most recent bill.494
On March 27, 1890, the Committee of the Whole reported the
proposed version of S. 1 to the full Senate.495 Senator George Edmunds
of Vermont, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, now addressed the

486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 2470; see also id. at 2469 (“State governments . . . have jurisdiction over
the great mass of transactions out of which these troubles grow.”).
491. Id. at 2470.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 2469 (reproducing proposed amendment).
494. See THORELLI, supra note 436, at 194; supra notes 439–42 and accompanying
text (describing the September 11 revision of the bill).
495. See 21 CONG. REC. 2723 (1890).

2020] ANTITRUST REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE 157
constitutional question at the urging of Senator George.496 Senator
Edmunds opined that the authority of Congress relative to trusts was
“narrow,” and that Congress had no power to supplant the exclusive
“police regulations” of the states.497 He also declared that the Senate
should resist pressure to pass legislation that exceeded Congress’s
constitutional power, even if inaction left people at the mercy of “the
most grinding and most stupendous of monopolies.”498 He reiterated
Senator George’s embrace of dual federalism and mutual exclusivity of
authority over commercial activity as well as the derivative conclusion
that states had exclusive jurisdiction over production.499 He instanced
the sugar trust as an example of an industry that, even if monopolized,
was beyond the authority of Congress to abolish:
[I]f every citizen of . . . Vermont . . . should implore me to pass an
act of Congress to abolish the sugar trust, as the Legislature of the
State of Vermont might do if it were established there, I should feel
it my duty to them to say, “No, because I have not the power to do
it[]” . . . .500

Instead, Congress merely possessed the power “for impeding and
harassing and cutting up the commercial transactions between the States
of these great monopolies.”501 Congress, he said, should go “[j]ust as far
as we can go in regulating the transition of property from State to State,”
but should “[not] go any further.”502 Like Senator Hiscock, he also
concurred as a matter of first principles with this allocation of power
between sovereigns.503
Senator Platt of Connecticut grudgingly agreed with George and
others, concluding that no provision in S. 1 was constitutional. In a

496. Id. at 2727 (statement of Sen. George) (urging Senator Edmunds to “go into
that matter fully”).
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. See id.
500. Id. at 2728.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 2727–28 (endorsing ban on “the movement of the commodities of these
great concerns and the arrangement of their transactions between the different
States,” but noting “it is quite impossible for me to support [Senator Sherman’s bill]”).
503. Id. at 2727 (“[The Constitution] did not give to the Congress of the United
States, and it did not mean to give, and it ought not to have given to it, and ought not to give
to it now, I think, the power to enter into the police regulations of the people of the
United States to endeavor to conduct or to manage or to regulate their affairs as the
States, in every State of the Union, have been authorized—not authorized, but left by
the Constitution in their original right to do.” (emphasis added)).
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colloquy with Senator Hoar, Platt opined that “the particular contract . . .
which might be reached under the [commerce power] must be
exceedingly limited.”504
These critiques apparently doomed Sherman’s bill. Shortly after
Senator Platt’s remarks, Senator Walthall moved to refer the bill and
various proposed amendments to the Judiciary Committee.505 While an
identical motion had failed a few days earlier, Walthall’s motion narrowly
passed.506 One scholar has attributed the Senate’s changed attitude to the
remarks of Senator Edmunds regarding the constitutionality of
Sherman’s latest proposal.507
Instead of tinkering with the bill, the Committee, chaired by Senator
Edmunds and including Senators George, Hoar, and Vest, proposed a
brand new bill six days later that did not invoke the power to impose
tariffs or the diversity jurisdiction as sources of regulatory authority.508
Modern scholars agree that Edmunds drafted sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6
of the Act, except for seven words in section 1 drafted by Senator
Evarts: “in the form of trust or otherwise.”509 A historian has quipped
that the statute “known as the Sherman Antitrust Act” was more
accurately called “the Edmunds Antitrust Act.”510
The Senate considered the proposal on April 8, 1890. Edmunds
reported that the Committee decided to:
[F]rame a bill that should be clearly within our constitutional power,
[and to] make its definition out of terms that were well known to the
law already, and would leave it to the courts in the first instance to
say how far they could carry it or its definitions as applicable to each
particular case . . . .511

504. See id. at 2568. The only exception, Senator Hoar said, was when the
“combination . . . affect[s] the price which is to be paid by the person who is to acquire
[products] to be delivered to him in another State.” Id.
505. Id. at 2731.
506. Id. at 2610–11, 2731 (passing by a vote of thirty-one yeas to twenty-eight nays).
507. THORELLI, supra note 436, at 198–99.
508. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1890) (as amended Apr. 2, 1890); 21 CONG. REC 3145 (1890);
THORELLI, supra note 436, at 199.
509. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT, 94 & n.9 (1954); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND
POLITICS, 115 & n.59 (1988); THORELLI, supra note 436, at 212; Albert H. Walker, Who
Wrote the Sherman Law?, 73 CENT. L.J. 257, 258 (1911).
510. See SKLAR, supra note 509, at 115.
511. 21 CONG. REC. 3148 (1890).
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Sherman expressed his intention to vote for the bill, “not as being
precisely what I want, but as the best under all the circumstances that
the Senate is prepared to give.”512 However, on the same day, he opined
that the measure would be “totally ineffective in dealing with
combinations and Trusts.”513
Senator George, by contrast, praised the new measure as the “best I
think that can be framed under that particular power of Congress, the
power over commerce, which the committee have attempted to frame
a bill under.”514 There were, he said, “one or two powers of Congress . . .
which the committee did not see proper to exercise,”515 presumably
referring to the power to remove tariffs protecting trust-dominated
industries.516 He also predicted that the public would be “great[ly]
disappoint[ed]” because the bill “cover[ed] . . . a very narrow territory,
leaving a very large number of these institutions, these trusts . . . without
the purview of the bill.”517 This was “not the fault of the committee.”518
Instead, in language the Supreme Court has quoted to support
expansive applications of the Act, George offered that: “[t]he bill has been
very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover every case which comes
within what is called the commercial power of Congress.”519 He added, in
language the Court omitted: “There is a great deal of this matter outside of
that.”520 No one disputed George’s description of the bill’s scope.
B. The House
Legislative history from one chamber of Congress cannot unilaterally
determine a statute’s meaning. The Constitution mandates bicameralism
and presentment, thereby requiring the interpreter to discern a meaning

512. Id. at 3145.
513. See Editorial, Mr. Sherman Gives up Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1890 at 4; see also
LETWIN, supra note 509, at 94 (“The Judiciary Committee took the matter out of
Sherman’s hands, much to his regret and anger.”).
514. 21 CONG. REC. 2901 (1890).
515. Id.
516. Id.; THORELLI, supra note 436, at 200 (concluding that Senator George had in
mind “his old idea that the President be authorized to suspend the tariff on trustcontrolled goods”).
517. 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890).
518. Id.
519. Id.; see supra note 428 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s invocation
of this sentence).
520. 21 CONG. REC. at 3147 (1890) (emphasis added); see United States v. Se.
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944) (selectively quoting this statement).
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to which both chambers agreed.521 Examination of the House’s
deliberations confirms that that chamber embraced the same approach
as the Senate. House proponents of the Senate bill did not question the
Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence or suggest that the Sherman Act
would expand whenever the Court devised a new standard governing
the scope of the commerce power.
The House of Representatives considered twelve trust-related bills
during the 50th Congress, but none received a vote.522 The House
referred the Senate bill to its own Judiciary Committee, which
unanimously recommended adoption of the bill.523 Like numerous
Senators, the Committee’s report embraced the Supreme Court’s dual
federalism and mutual exclusivity of authority over trade restraints:
“Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the subject [of
trusts] within the States, and the States have no authority to legislate
in respect of commerce between the several States.”524
The report did not suggest any departure from the Supreme Court’s
pre-1890 allocation of authority over commercial activity.525 Instead,
the report stated that the bill was “carefully confined to such subjects
of legislation as are clearly within the legislative authority of Congress”
and that “[n]o attempt [wa]s made to invade the legislative authority
of the several States or even to occupy doubtful grounds.”526 The Supreme
Court once candidly cited this report for the proposition that the 1890
Congress “took a very narrow view of its power under the Commerce
Clause.”527
Presenting the report to the House, Congressman Culberson, a
member of the Committee, opined that the “legislation occupies a new
field” and that Congress’s power over “questions of this character,” is,
with few exceptions, “extremely limited.”528 He also observed that “[t]here
is no attempt to exercise any doubtful authority on this subject, but the
521. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 718–19 (1997) (explaining how reliance on a committee report from a single
house of Congress circumvents the requirements of bicameralism and presentment).
522. See 21 CONG. REC. 4100 (1890) (statement of Rep. Heard).
523. Id.
524. See H.R. REP. NO. 51–1707, at 1 (1890).
525. See supra Part I (describing these boundaries).
526. H.R. REP. NO. 51–1707, at 1 (emphasis added).
527. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976). The Court
nonetheless went on to hold that the Sherman Act reached local anticompetitive
conduct that produced no interstate harm because such conduct produced a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 744–47.
528. 21 CONG. REC. 4089 (1890).
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bill is confined strictly and alone to subjects over which, confessedly,
there is no question about the legislative power of Congress.”529 Both
states and the Congress would have to exercise the powers they
possessed in their respective mutually exclusive spheres. For Congress,
this meant the power to “take charge of the trade between the States and
[to] make unlawful traffic that operates in restraint of trade.”530 Echoing
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, he opined that an
interstate agreement between a manufacturer and dealers authorizing
the latter to undersell rivals and drive them out of business was
“directly in restraint of trade and commerce” and “secure[d] for the
corporation a monopoly, in part, of interstate trade.”531
Others emphasized similar themes. Congressman Ezra Taylor, the
Committee’s chair, opined that the bill “goes as far . . . as Congress has
the power to go under the Constitution,” and that states would have to
supplement its provisions because Congress “can only deal with
interstate transactions.”532 Congressman Elijah Morse of Massachusetts
later agreed, stating that “Congress has no [power over] trusts within
a State.”533 Instead, the “bill propose[d] to regulate transactions in
restraint of trade between citizens of different States.”534 Congressman
John Rogers concurred; he claimed to have read every bill introduced
in both houses “upon the subject of trusts,” and concluded that the
Senate bill was the only one that “could receive [the] sanction . . . of
my oath.”535 Sherman’s bill, he said, “when brought under the scrutiny
of the law, was completely eviscerated and destroyed.”536 The Senate bill
was a “conservative measure . . . within the scope of the Constitution.”537
Amendments to expand the bill’s coverage, he said, “would not hold
water for a minute” if “brought to the test of adjudicated cases,” with
which he expressed no disagreement.538
*****

529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Id.
Id. at 4091 (emphasis added).
Id. at 4089.
Id. at 4098.
Id. at 5953.
Id.
Id. at 4101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In sum, nothing in the Act’s legislative history suggests that Congress
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s dual federalism jurisprudence.
Sherman’s own proposals would have reached some conduct that the
Court’s jurisprudence assigned to the exclusive authority of the states.539
However, both houses of Congress apparently rejected Sherman’s
account of the scope of the commerce power and embraced a narrower
version of the “Sherman Act” than Sherman proposed. According to
Senator Edmunds, the author of section 1, the Act employed “terms
that were well known to the law already,” i.e., terms of art, to describe
the content and scope of the Act.540 Senator George, Senator Edmunds,
and several others embraced case law that treated state and federal
authority over commerce as mutually exclusive,541 as the Supreme
Court would later hold in Addyston Pipe and E.C. Knight, for instance.542
Indeed, Senator Edmunds endorsed the (future) result in E.C. Knight,
opining that Congress lacked authority to regulate the sugar trust,
despite its monopoly over the national sugar market.543 He also agreed
with this allocation of authority.544 The House embraced the Senate
language, and its Judiciary Committee report disclaimed any intent by
Congress to exercise a “doubtful” authority but instead to reach those
subjects “clearly within the . . . authority of Congress.”545
No member of Congress suggested the Act would reach local
conduct such as intrastate cartels. Even Sherman stated that states
possessed exclusive authority over intrastate cartels and that the Act
would only reach restraints that “injuriously affect the interests of the
United States.”546 Nor did any member suggest the scope of the Act
would expand if the Court revised the principle governing the scope of
the commerce power. Some members of Congress expressly embraced
the Court’s pre-1890 jurisprudence as a matter of first principles and
thus presumably would have rejected the modern Court’s more
expansive account of the commerce power. Far from purporting to
exercise whatever power the Supreme Court might later create,
539. Cf. supra notes 449–54 and accompanying text (explaining George’s critique
of Sherman’s proposals as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power).
540. See 21 CONG. REC. 3148 (1890); supra note 511 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 457, 497 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 273, 335–38 and accompanying text.
543. See supra note 500 and accompanying text (describing Edmunds’ views).
544. See supra note 499 and accompanying text.
545. See H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890); 21 CONG. REC. 4089 (1890); supra notes
526, 529 and accompanying text.
546. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (emphasis added).
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Congress chose merely to exercise that power the Court allowed in
1890. Any claim that the 1890 Congress would have exercised the full
scope of the modern commerce power, banning what Sherman
himself called “combination[s] . . . confined to a [single] State” that
produced no interstate harm, is sheer speculation, with no support in
the legislative history.547
VII. IMPLICATIONS
Recognition that the Supreme Court erred when it replaced the
direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test does not
thereby require the Court to return to the pre-1948 allocation of
authority over antitrust matters. The doctrine of stare decisis generally
has particularly strong claims in the statutory context, and, in that
sense, may seem to require the Court to adhere to the substantial
effects test.548 However, the Sherman Act is no ordinary statute where
stare decisis is concerned. Instead, the Court has repeatedly held that
a “competing interest . . . in recognizing and adapting to changed
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience” weakens
the doctrine in the antitrust context.549 Congress, the Court has said,
expected the Court to “shape . . . the statute’s broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition.”550 As explained earlier, the Rule of
Reason itself contemplates that the Court will adjust Sherman Act
doctrine over time in response to changed economic conceptions or
conditions.551
The rationale for a weakened version of stare decisis in the antitrust
context implies its own limits, however. Antitrust decisions reversing
prior holdings invariably invoke changed facts or economic theories,
extrinsic to the Court itself and thus exogenous to the legal process.552
The negative implication, and one consistent with the metaphor of

547. See id. at 2457.
548. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
549. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); see also Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899–900 (2007); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
550. Khan, 522 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)) (rejecting the “general presumption that legislative changes
should be left to Congress” in the context of the Sherman Act).
551. See supra note 128–29 and accompanying text.
552. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92 (abandoning precedent based on changed
theoretical understanding of the challenged practice).

164

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:75

interpretive translation, is that the identification of mere legal error does
not, even in the Sherman Act context, justify revision of prior decisions.553
Thus, the outcome of any stare decisis analysis in this context may
well depend upon how the Court understands its prior decisions
expanding the Act to reach intrastate restraints that pose no interstate
harm. If the Court attributes the 1948 change to a revised—though
perhaps erroneous—legal understanding of the meaning of the Act,
stare decisis may well be insurmountable. The Court could take a
different approach, however, attributing the 1948 revision to changed
economic circumstances—such as increased integration of the national
economy and/or larger scale of enterprises—that purportedly
undermine the rationale for exclusive state authority over local restraints
that produce substantial effects on interstate commerce and justify
national regulation.554 If the Court adopts this latter rationale for its
rejection of the direct/indirect standard, stare decisis should yield to
post-1948 developments in the theory of competitive federalism
confirming that states possess appropriate incentives to generate
impartial rules with respect to intrastate restraints producing substantial
but indirect effects on interstate commerce.555 The result would be a
return to the direct/indirect standard for allocating authority over trade
restraints between states and the national government.
Abandoning the substantial effects test and retracting the scope of
the Sherman Act would reboot competitive federalism in the antitrust
field. States would again be free to adopt unique antitrust doctrine
applicable to restraints that occur within their borders and produce no
external harm. States would reap the benefits of doctrinal innovations,
with no prospect that federal courts applying the Sherman Act will
undermine state-specific policies.556 The resulting competition between
the states acting as “laboratories of democracy”557 would presumably
generate a wider variety of possible solutions—both substantive and
institutional—to various antitrust problems, as states vie for producers
553. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (discussing translation
methodology).
554. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1991); McLain
v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); see also Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948) (stating that the
“evolving nature of our industrialism” condemned E.C. Knight and its progeny).
555. See supra Section II.B.
556. Meese, supra note 89, at 85–86.
557. See supra note 390 and accompanying text (collecting authorities characterizing
states as laboratories of democracy).
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and consumers by offering rival packages of antitrust doctrine and
enforcement institutions.558 This decentralized process of articulating
antitrust doctrine and policy would generate both experience and data
about the impact of various rules and institutions, thereby informing
lawmakers and state courts considering possible reforms. Federal courts,
too, could learn from these results, drawing upon the “accumulated
experience” of various states when fashioning Sherman Act doctrine.559
Retraction of the scope of the Sherman Act would also radically alter
the prominence and role of the state action doctrine, first articulated
in 1943 in Parker v. Brown.560 As noted earlier, the vast majority of cases
where parties raise the state action defense involve police power
regulations restraining local commerce without producing any
interstate harm.561 No doubt the resulting framing of the legal question
as a clash between the Sherman Act and historic police power
regulation has deterred the Court from invoking the Act as a source of
general authority to evaluate the “reasonableness” of garden variety
state regulations, especially during the 1940s, when faith in the motives
and capacity of regulators was at its apogee.562 Indeed, scholars and
jurists have attributed Parker to just such an anti-Lochnerian impulse.563
Restoration of the pre-1948 direct/indirect standard would place such
local regulations beyond the reach of the Sherman Act altogether,
eliminating the need for any state action analysis with respect to such
restraints.564 The Supreme Court’s state action docket would shrink
accordingly. Moreover, state action cases that did reach the Court would

558. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining how the substantial
effects test and coextensive authority over trade restraints discourage effective rivalry
between the states).
559. See supra note 188 (collecting authorities detailing conditions necessary for
competitive federalism to produce trend toward optimal legislation).
560. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
561. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
562. See Hovenkamp, supra note 101, at 633–34 (attributing Parker in part to the
Court’s pro-regulatory bias).
563. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 500 (1987) (“Having only just determined not to use the
Constitution [to supervise state legislation under the due process clause], the Court
was not about to resurrect [Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),] in the garb of
the Sherman Act.”); Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on
Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 336–37 (1975) (contending that judicial
aversion to the Lochner era’s scrutiny of economic regulation informed the Court’s
state action doctrine).
564. See Meese, supra note 247, at 2191–92.
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differ significantly from those that have thus far informed the Court’s
treatment of state-imposed restraints. Instead of state regulations of
local billboards, dentistry, and intrastate lawyer advertising, such cases
would, like Parker, involve state restraints imposing substantial harm on
out-of-state consumers.565 This new framing could force the current
Court, less friendly to regulation than the Parker Court, to reconsider
its hands-off approach to state-approved restraints. Reducing the scope
of the Sherman Act could ironically result in more robust preemption
of state-approved restraints than ever accomplished under the post1948 regime.
Finally, the history recounted here would also alter the nature of the
question posed. The Parker Court emphasized the absence of any
indication that Congress anticipated preempting state-approved restraints
of interstate commerce.566 However, the question that produced this
answer was an anachronism. The Congress that enacted the Sherman Act
would have assumed that state-approved direct restraints of interstate
commerce would fall prey to the Court’s quasi-statutory regime of implied
preemption.567 Today, of course, the Court refuses to interdict such
restraints under what is now known as the dormant Commerce Clause.
Thus, the real question for a court reconsidering the Sherman Act’s
treatment of state-approved restraints is how Congress would have treated
such restraints absent implied preemption, and this question could
produce a quite different answer.

565. Id.
566. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
567. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

